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STUDY OF THE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED 




The purpose of this MBA Project is to analyze the procedures followed in the 
acquisition of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle.  The MRAP 
program, initiated in response to the improvised explosive device (IED) threat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, is unprecedented in timeline and scale.  As such, it provides a unique case 
study on the rapid acquisition of a major military system in response to an urgent 
operational need.   
The objective of this research is to provide a guide for future rapid acquisition 
programs by documenting the conduct of the MRAP program from the initial needs 
identification and program start in 2006 through production and fielding at the time of 
this writing.  The major analysis will focus on the program as a rapid acquisition within 
the context of the Acquisition Management and Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) framework.  The goal for analysis is to answer the 
following question:  What are the key factors and decisions that contributed to program 
success, with success defined as meeting program objectives and warfighter needs?  In 
addition, this report will address the key trade-offs made within the MRAP program and 
the potential long-term impacts of these decisions.  The results will serve as a guide for 
future development of other rapid acquisition initiatives and assist future acquisition 
leaders in decision-making. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In late 2006, the Department of Defense (DoD) launched a major acquisition 
program to rapidly procure thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles 
(MRAPs)1 for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.  With a raised, V-shaped, armored hull, 
MRAPs provide improved protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)–the 
insurgent weapon of choice and greatest casualty producer in Iraq–when compared to up-
armored high mobility, multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and other flat-bottomed 
vehicles.  The unprecedented scope of the MRAP program, combined with its rapid 
execution, presents an opportunity to study a major rapid acquisition program.  
In standard DoD acquisitions for major systems, the source selection process 
typically results in a contract award to one manufacturer.  This provides a common 
design that simplifies training and sustainment operations.  In the case of the MRAP 
program, however, mounting causalities from IEDs made the program the number one 
DoD acquisition priority.  Consequently, decision-makers emphasized getting the 
capability into the hands of warfighters at the earliest opportunity.  Because no single 
supplier had the capacity to quickly build the required number of vehicles, the program 
used multiple vehicle designs from multiple manufacturers to meet the requirement.  
Although this makes the fullest use of the defense industrial base and provides the fastest 
production in the short run, it comes at the expense of maintainability and lifecycle costs 
in the long run. 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to document and analyze the process of acquiring 
the MRAP vehicle from the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) in 2005 to the time of 
this writing (October 2008).  The objective is to focus on all aspects of rapid procurement 
                                                 
1 It has become common for the acronym “MRAP” to connote “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
vehicle” (with the word “vehicle” being implied in the acronym). The use of “MRAP” in this project 
reflects this widespread terminology, and the MRAP vehicle is sometimes referred to simply as “the 
MRAP.” 
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and identify key elements that contributed to the program’s success.  The results will 
serve as a guide for the future development of other rapid acquisition initiatives and assist 
future acquisition leaders in decision-making. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The first objective with this research is to provide a guide for future rapid 
acquisition programs based on the limited time under which the MRAP vehicle was 
procured.  This report will document the conduct of the program from the initial needs 
identification and program start in 2006 through production and fielding at the time of 
this writing.  The major analysis will focus on the MRAP program as a rapid acquisition 
within the context of the Acquisition Management and Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) framework.  The goal of this analysis is to answer the 
following question:  What are the key factors and decisions from this program that 
contributed to success, with success defined as meeting program objectives and 
warfighter needs?  In addition, this report will address the key trade-offs made within the 
MRAP program and the potential long-term impacts of these decisions. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This report focuses on three broad areas within the MRAP program.  First, it 
addresses the program management and contracting issues.  This includes an overview 
and analysis of the needs identification, generation of required capabilities, source 
selection, contracting actions, budget and finance actions, and the program management 
organization.  The second focus area covers testing and evaluation, resource constraints, 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) involvement and contractor 
certification, manufacturing, quality control, and integration of Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE).  The third and final focus area details the program fielding and 
support strategy, training plan, logistics, and transportation plan. 
The framework for this analysis involves identifying the key factors that 
contributed to success in each of the three focus areas.  The research draws on documents 
available from open sources such as major news reports, the Government Accountability 
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Office (GAO) and other government reports, academic and research papers, and 
information provided by the program office.  The analysis also includes interviews with 
the Program Manager (PM) and others from the Joint Program Office (JPO), key program 
participants from DCMA, the Commander of Aberdeen Test Center (ATC), senior 
officials at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) involved in the 
integration effort, and interviews with senior managers for two MRAP producers and one 
major subcontractor to the effort.  
D. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This research identifies the key aspects of the MRAP program that contributed to 
its success.  It does not, however, identify every factor that contributed to the program; 
therefore, it is not a comprehensive overview of the program from the perspective of all 
stakeholders.  For example, the research does not include feedback from users in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and it draws on visits and interviews with only two of the five MRAP 
manufacturers.  In addition, this research does not provide the perspective of the 
program’s largest customer, the U.S. Army.2  Finally, considering the unique nature and 
large scale of this program, this report does not provide a comprehensive view of all rapid 








                                                 
2 Numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to interview MRAP program representatives at the U.S. 
Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command (TACOM). 
3 The majority of acquisition programs considered rapid are much smaller in scale [Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) II—IV] and do not have the same political or senior DoD level emphasis. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In many ways, September 11, 2001, marks a transition point for the United States 
military.  This infamous day not only ushered in a new era of conflict against terrorist 
organizations, but it also began a continuous process of transformation within the military 
Services, particularly the Army and the Marine Corps.  Instead of facing a clearly 
recognizable enemy on a well-defined battlefield, the U.S. now fights a patient enemy 
who waits for battle on its own terms.  This enemy is constantly studying tactics, 
techniques, and procedures to exploit weaknesses and avoid situations in which the U.S. 
has a technological or military advantage.  This has forced a continuous process of 
adaptation in response to this ever-changing enemy.  The new emphasis on 
counterinsurgency warfare, as documented in the recently published Army Field Manual, 
FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), clearly demonstrates this shift in how the U.S. Army 
fights.   
The evolving battlefield brought more than just a change in warfighting doctrine; 
it also demanded changes in the hardware the U.S. military has used for decades. Simply 
looking at readily available photos of currently deployed forces compared to those from 
early in the conflict reveals the changes. The Army now wears a new uniform, body 
armor, helmet, and other individual gear and employs heavily armored vehicles, robots, 
and jamming devices.  With an all-volunteer military, force protection is arguably more 
important now than in previous wars.  As such, much of the new equipment is for added 
Soldier survivability.  The single, most important stimulus in these hardware upgrades is 
the current enemy’s weapon of choice and greatest killer: the improvised explosive 
device or IED.  Accounting for roughly half the U.S. casualties in Iraq and about a third 
of those in Afghanistan, the IED created the need for the MRAP vehicle.  Given the 
rapidly evolving battlefield and materiel requirements, speed in defense acquisition is 
arguably more important now than at any time since World War II. 
With this emphasis on speed in defense acquisitions in response to warfighter 
needs, significant research effort has been dedicated to rapid acquisitions in recent years. 
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This chapter reviews the outcomes of that research, the regulatory framework regarding 
rapid acquisitions, and presents a summary of the key factors that apply to the MRAP 
program. 
A. GENERAL 
MRAPs are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and 
international companies that generally incorporate a V-shaped hull and armor plating 
designed to provide protection against mines and IEDs.  The DoD is procuring three 
types of MRAPs: Category I (CAT I) vehicles, weighing about 7 tons and capable of 
carrying 6 passengers; CAT II vehicles, weighing about 19 tons and capable of carrying 
10 passengers; and CAT III vehicles, intended to be used primarily to clear mines and 
IEDs, weighing about 22.5 tons and capable of carrying up to 12 passengers. The Army 
and Marine Corps first employed MRAPs in limited numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
2003—primarily for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.  
These route clearance MRAPs quickly gained a reputation for providing superior 
protection for their crews, and critics suggested that MRAPs might be a better alternative 
for transporting troops in combat than up-armored HMMWVs (Feickert, 2007, p. 1). 
B. MRAP OVERVIEW 
1. History 
MRAP technology is not new.  It was developed in South Africa in the early 
1960s to mid-1970s for the armed forces of various South African nations in combating 
the same type of IED threat that U.S. forces face today (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).  
Engineers of that era concluded that mine blasts could be directed out and away from a 
vehicle by elevating the chassis and creating a V-shaped hull along its base. Variants 
based on this original MRAP technology have been in production outside the United 
States since that time by subsidiaries of General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and 
BAE Systems.  The United Nations has relied upon these vehicles for mine and route 
clearing operations in southern Africa and Eastern Europe.  
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As a result of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq [Operations Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF)], warfighters identified a need for a series of 
vehicles designed to survive the catastrophic threats posed by the Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED), as well as from conventional mine and ambush tactics.  These vehicles 
were collectively described as MRAP capable and would be specifically built to defeat 
these threats.  
The MRAP vehicle’s success at protecting its passengers was widely known prior 
to the 1990s but only recently recognized by the United States DoD.  The DoD first 
tested the MRAP in FY 2000.  Following testing, the Army purchased an additional 10 
vehicles for contingency purposes that were subsequently used in the Global War on 
Terror, primarily by EOD teams.  These vehicles were the Joint Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle (JERRV) and the Buffalo, both manufactured by Force 
Protection Industries, Incorporated (FPII) (Inspector General, 2007, pp. 4-7).  Given the 
success of these vehicles against IEDs, the DoD quickly recognized them as an effective 
materiel solution. 
Warfighters initially requested MRAPs as early as 2003.  However, due to time, 
budgetary considerations, and the general optimism and belief in a short conflict in Iraq, 
senior defense officials focused their efforts on up-armored HMMWVs and other anti-
IED efforts such as bolt-on armor kits.  As the conflict progressed and the enemy shifted 
tactics from road-side bombs to buried, under-body attacks, it became apparent that up-
armored HMMWVs did not provide the necessary level of protection (Hansen, 2008, 
June 10).  MRAP requests increased, and in late 2006, the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) validated a requirement for 1,185 vehicles.  The first request for 
proposal (RFP) for the MRAP was released November 9, 2006, and the JPO was 
subsequently established December 6, 2006 (Mann, 2008, Slide 4).  Given the Marine 
Corps’ lead in the program, the JPO was established within Marine Corps Systems 
Command (MARCORSYSCOM), and Mr. Paul Mann was transferred from Naval Sea 
Systems Command to serve as the PM.  Although initially an Acquisition Category 
(ACAT) III program, it received high level attention from the start with the Assistant 
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Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASNRD&A), Dr. 
Dolores Etter, serving as the program’s first Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
(Owen, 2008, p. 5). 
2. Capabilities and Characteristics 
 The generic MRAP is a diesel (JP-8)4 powered, 3-5 ton capacity, four-wheel-
drive vehicle with a V-shaped hull and heavy armor encapsulating the crew and 
passenger compartments.  It is approximately 19 feet long, 9 feet wide, and 8.6 feet tall 
and is equipped with an automatic transmission.  In addition to the driver and vehicle 
commander, the vehicle has seating for four to eight passengers, depending on the 
variant.  The vehicle is equipped with driver and commander doors, a rear door or ramp 
for the passenger compartment, and a single vehicle accessibility hatch on the roof.  
Some variants also have a gunner’s turret placed close to the front of the vehicle. 
MRAPs are equipped with heating and air conditioning units; they are Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical (NBC) over-pressure and filter protected, and are equipped with 
a winch capable of recovering an identical vehicle.  The minimum hard-bottom fording 
depth is 36 inches, and the vehicle is capable of both on- and off-road travel.  It is 
equipped with run-flat tires that are monitored by a central tire inflation system. All 
variants are transportable by the C-17 Starlifter and the C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft.  
The armor package on the MRAP provides all-around coverage, while the glass is multi-
strike resistant.  These characteristics protect the crew from blast, shock, fragments, and 
the acceleration effects of mine blasts (MRAP JPO, 2006).  The V-shaped hull is 
specifically designed to redirect the blast out and away from the vehicle’s passenger area.  
While the vehicle may be disabled by the explosion, the intent is to keep the passengers 
alive and, ideally, allow vehicle recovery and repair.  
The figures below depict how the most widely produced MRAP, the International 
Military and Government, LLC (IMG) MaxxPro, compares in size to both the Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) currently in development and to the HMMWV.  These figures 
                                                 
4 JP-8 is a kerosene-based fuel common to a variety of U.S. military vehicles to include aircraft, 
trucks, and armored vehicles. 
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show that the increased survivability is gained at the expense of a significant increase in 
size and weight, as well as a corresponding reduction in maneuverability. 
 
 
             MRAP           JLTV        HMMWV 
 
Figure 1.   MRAP Compared to the JLTV and the HMMWV 
(From Hansen, 2008, June 4, Slides 13-14) 
 
3. Need 
In February 2005, Marine Corps Brigadier General Dennis Hejlik, Deputy 
Commander of 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, submitted an urgent need request.  The 
six-page document stated, “There is a need for the MRAP vehicle capability to increase 
survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area against known 
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threats.  The ‘expanded use’ of roadside bombs, rocket propelled grenades, and small 
arms fire in Al Anbar province requires a more robust family of vehicles” (Sherman & 
Castelli, 2007).  His request went unfilled for four months, and the issue surfaced again in 
a June 10, 2005, status report indicating that the Marine Corps was holding out for a 
“future vehicle,” presumably the JLTV—more mobile than the MRAP, but more 
protective than the HMMWV.  This vehicle was not expected to be available, however, 
until 2012 (Eisler, Moorison, & Vanden Brook, 2007). 
In May and July 2006, the Multi-National Forces West (MNF-W) Commander in 
Iraq submitted urgent universal need statement (UUNS) requests for 185 and then an 
additional 1,000 vehicles.  Those requests were combined and designated as a Joint 
Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) by the Central Command (CENTCOM) 
commander in October 2006.  After the JROC validated that initial request, 
MARCORSYSCOM released the initial RFP on November 9, and the MRAP JPO was 
established within MARCORSYSCOM shortly thereafter on December 6.  To illustrate 
the early uncertainty in the program, the initial 1,185 requirement grew to 15,374 
vehicles by September 2007 (Mann, 2008, slide 3).  By March 2007, the Marine Corps 
Commandant, James Conway, called the vehicle his “Number 1 unfulfilled warfighting 
requirement” (Eisler, Moorison, & Vanden Brook, 2007).  In May 2007, the Secretary of 
Defense, Mr. Robert Gates, made MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority.  In addition, 
Secretary Gates assigned the program a DX rating (priority rating reserved for the top 
acquisition programs) in June 2007, and by September of that year, the program was 
designated an ACAT 1D Program, placing oversight in the hands of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Miles, 2007). 
4. Manufacturers 
The source selection process resulted in the procurement of MRAP vehicles from 
five different manufacturers:  BAE Systems (BAE); Armor Holdings (AH) (now owned 
by BAE Systems); General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS); Force Protection 
Industries, Inc. (FPII); and Navistar’s International Military and Government, LLC 
subsidiary (IMG) (now called Navistar Defense).  Although limited commonality exists 
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in engines, transmissions, tires, and axles, it was not a major concern in the source 
selection decision, demonstrating the program emphasis on procuring vehicles quickly 
from multiple manufacturers at the expense of long-term sustainability and lifecycle 
costs. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which is 
normally a methodical and sequential process, provides the framework under which all 
joint, top-driven acquisition programs are conducted.  The MRAP program, although 
rapid and unique in nature, was conducted within this framework, albeit in a highly 
tailored manner.  This section provides an overview of the JCIDS process as it is relevant 
to the MRAP program.  
JCIDS is the most current procedure used by the DoD to articulate warfighter 
needs and establish a basis for future defense acquisition programs.  The JCIDS replaced 
what was formerly known as the Requirements Generation System (RGS) and, with that, 
the costly redundancies that each Service required within its own Service-specific stove-
pipe.  The purpose of JCIDS is to provide the guidelines for generating required 
capabilities and identifying joint needs.  This top-down approach to decision-making 
determines if a required capability exists, then assigns a resource sponsor within the DoD 
for acquisition (Jones & McCaffery, 2008, pp. 569-570). 
Three key processes within the DoD must work hand-in-hand to ensure that 
warfighter needs are met.  As illustrated in Figure 2, they are the requirements process 
(JCIDS), the acquisition process, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution System (PPBES).  To provide systems that meet the needed capabilities, these 
three processes must be synchronized to support decision-making (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2007, p. 2).   This synchronization is complicated by the differing nature 
of the three processes.  While PPBES is calendar-driven, the JCIDS and acquisitions 
processes are event-driven.  In the case of an immediate need, the JCIDS process can 
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quickly validate a capability gap and identify a suitable materiel solution.  Constrained by 
the calendar-driven PPBES process, however, the acquisition process may be unable to 
make the procurement until the next budget cycle is complete.  This process can take up 
to two years, depending on what time of year the need is identified.   Because of this time 
lapse, JCIDS is unresponsive to immediate needs unless funds are made available 




Figure 2.   Major Decision Support Systems 
(From Nalwasky, 2007, Slide 5) 
 
The JCIDS process was developed not only to identify joint warfighting 
requirements but also to prioritize them.  While the central objective of JCIDS is to attend 
to the shortfalls of joint operations as defined by combatant commanders, the primary 
objective is to ensure that warfighters receive what is needed to accomplish the mission.  
The decision authority for the capabilities requirements is the JROC, which reviews, 
validates, and makes recommendations on acquisition programs based on their categories 
and key performance parameters.  The JROC prioritizes acquisition programs and 
validates capabilities as well as performance criteria for these programs.  The JROC 
review and validation is a key factor in the milestone decision authority’s decision to 
initiate a development program (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, pp. 2-3).   
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The first step in initiating the JCIDS process is to conduct a capabilities-based 
assessment (CBA) that identifies the capabilities required, performance criteria, and 
shortfalls of existing systems to meet those requirements.  This process results in a Joint 
Capabilities Document (JCD) or Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that validates the 
need to address a capability gap and verifies that affordable and technically feasible 
solutions exist to address those requirements.  Following validation, the JCD or ICD 
becomes the basis for further analysis by the assigned action Service or agency.  This 
analysis results in a Capabilities Development Document (CDD) that identifies the best 
technical approach. CDD approval by the JROC validates the key performance 
parameters of the selected approach, assesses the risk with respect to cost, schedule, and 
technology maturity, and assesses the affordability of the system based on available 
resources.  JROC approval of the CDD is one of the key factors involved in the decision 
to initiate a program (pp. 2-3). 
The JROC’s role during the entire process and in approving the ICD, CDD, and 
the Capabilities Production Document (CPD) is to make certain that the system being 
developed meets the required capability, does not stray from the original requirement as 
defined in the JCD or ICD, and remains affordable.  The JCIDS process has been 
continually refined since its inception, and the information required at each level is well 
scrutinized to ensure that effective and appropriate decisions are made.  The following 
passage from the executive summary of the JCIDS overview document summarizes the 
process’s intent: 
The JCIDS process was designed to be a robust process to support the 
complex decisions required of the JROC and the acquisition community in 
identifying and procuring future capabilities. Recognizing that not all 
capabilities/weapon systems require the same level of consideration, the 
JCIDS process is tailorable.  The JROC has identified several alternative 
paths to allow accelerated identification of capability gaps and potential 
solutions, and to allow them to enter into the JCIDS process at the 
appropriate stage to deliver those capabilities more rapidly. (Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, p. 3) 
As this project will demonstrate, the flexibility offered by this tailorable approach 
was a key factor in the rapid execution of the MRAP program.  The synchronization 
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required between the JCIDS, acquisition, and PPBES processes demonstrate that a large-
scale, rapid acquisition program will likely require a non-standard source of funding to 
enable truly rapid procurement. 
2. Rapid Acquisition Processes 
Although obvious in its utility, the ability to rapidly react to changing battlefield 
needs is not inherent in the acquisition system.  This deliberate and methodical process 
can take years and even decades to progress from need identification to fielding of a new 
system.  In recognition of this, the overarching DoD acquisition directive (DoD Directive 
5000.1) states the following:   
There is no one best way to structure an acquisition program to 
accomplish the objective of the Defense Acquisition System.  MDAs and 
PMs shall tailor program strategies and oversight, including 
documentation of program information, acquisition phases, the timing and 
scope of decision reviews, and decision levels, to fit the particular 
conditions of that program, consistent with applicable laws and regulations 
and the time-sensitivity of the capability need. (Under Secretary of 
Defense, 2003a, p. 3) 
As a result of this directive and of prior efforts to streamline the acquisition 
process, each of the Services and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have 
developed procedures to rapidly place needed capabilities into warfighters’ hands. 
In his 2006 thesis, Michael W. Middleton describes these Service rapid 
acquisition processes, providing overviews of the Marine Corps Urgent Universal Needs 
Statement (UUNS), the Navy Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC), the Army Rapid 
Equipping Force (REF), the Air Force Rapid Response Process (RRP), and the SOCOM 
Combat Mission Needs Statement (C-MNS).  Although different in execution, they are 
similar in their efforts to meet urgent warfighter needs.  Middleton states:   
Many of the Service rapid acquisition systems are limited to existing 
Service budgets and affect only that Service’s materiel portfolio. These 
Service initiatives allow increased flexibility and are managed by existing 




strategies. The Services also manage the long-term rapid acquisition of the 
materiel and may incorporate it more fully where feedback dictates. (2006, 
pp. 11-12)  
In addition, these procedures apply only to ACAT II, III, and IV programs, thereby 
limiting the program scope to $140 million for research and development and $660 
million for procurement (in FY2000 dollars) (Under Secretary of Defense, 2003b, p. 21). 
 To further demonstrate the emphasis on rapid acquisitions in support of urgent 
operational needs, the Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Research, Development, 
and Engineering Command (RDECOM), COL(P) Peter N. Fuller summarized five 
distinct processes in the Army alone that provide robust capabilities to warfighters.  The 
JUONS, validated through the Joint Staff, applies to requirements that support more than 
one Service.  The ONS is similar to the JUONS but for requirements unique to the Army.  
The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) provides solutions to mitigate IED threats, 
typically in response to JUONS requirements.  The JCIDS system, referred to as the PM 
Informal process, attempts to adjust system performance requirements in existing 
acquisition programs based on direct contact between field commanders and PMs.  This 
direct warfighter-to-PM coordination takes advantage of existing development work and 
in effect starts the program before formal approval.  The final process, the Rapid 
Equipping Force (REF), involves forward-deployed teams evaluating needs and rapidly 
fielding solutions to those needs, largely through commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items.  
The existence of these overlapping and mutually supporting processes demonstrates the 
need for and emphasis on rapid acquisitions, but it sustains inefficiencies in addressing 
evolving changes in requirements precipitated by rapidly changing threats.  As Fuller 
points out, however, these processes nevertheless incorporate considerable innovation 
and flexibility to speed acquisitions when compared to the conventional JCIDS process 
(2008). 
3. Regulatory Framework Governing Rapid Acquisitions 
Legislative authority for rapid acquisition comes from two primary sources:  
Section 806 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 
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Year 2003 (U.S. Congress, 2002) and Section 811 of the Ronald Reagan National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (U.S. Congress, 2004).  A thorough 
knowledge of both is essential in understanding the legal limitations on a rapid 
acquisition program. 
The first piece of legislation, Section 806 of the Bob Stump NDAA required that 
the Secretary of Defense establish a process for rapid acquisition and deployment of 
items that:  1) are currently available or under development, and 2) are urgently needed to 
react to an enemy threat or to respond to significant and urgent safety situations.  The law 
further requires establishment of procedures to streamline communication of warfighter 
needs, procedures for demonstrating, rapidly acquiring, and deploying capabilities that 
meet these needs, and procedures for adequately testing these items and incorporating test 
results into decision-making.  The law limits the scope of this authority by limiting the 
quantity of items procured using these procedures to the number established for low-rate 
initial production (LRIP) for the system (U.S. Congress, 2002).  This definition is 
somewhat vague in its meaning, however; the LRIP quantity can differ by system type 
and the MDA holds significant latitude in determining the LRIP quantity (Under 
Secretary of Defense, 2003b, p. 13).   
Section 811 of the Ronald Reagan NDAA provides additional authority with 
respect to rapid acquisition by directing the Secretary of Defense to appoint a senior 
official within the DoD to oversee the acquisition of equipment to eliminate a combat 
capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities.  This official is authorized to 
waive any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation concerning the establishment 
of need; the requirement for research, development, testing, and evaluation; and the 
source selection and contract award for procuring the equipment.  The official’s 
responsibility is to facilitate rapid acquisition and deployment of the needed equipment, 
with a goal of 15 days for awarding the acquisition contract.  Again, this law seeks to 
limit this authority—this time by establishing a maximum of $100 million as the 
aggregate limit for an item during a fiscal year (U.S. Congress, 2004). 
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4. The Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP) 
The Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP) is an Army program that 
predates the OEF and OIF-inspired initiatives such as the ONS and JUONS.  The WRAP 
was “directed at accelerating procurement of systems identified through TRADOC5 
warfighting experiments as compelling successes which satisfy an urgent need” 
(Department of the Army, 1997, Paragraph 5-5).  Where current processes focus on 
eliminating capability gaps for warfighters in an operational environment, the WRAP, 
formalized by Army Regulation in 1997, was a peacetime process designed to streamline 
the acquisition process for the most promising systems under development.  
Consequently, the benchmark for a rapid acquisition process was much slower than is 
acceptable in the current environment.  Many of the lessons learned from this program 
still apply, however, and are relevant to current rapid acquisition processes. 
The Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle—Enhanced (BSFV-E, now known as the 
Bradley Linebacker) was the first program managed under the WRAP.  This program, 
which filled an urgent air defense capability need for the Army, was an ACAT IV 
program costing $20.1 million.  It was also a non-developmental program that focused on 
modifying GFE components such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Stinger air defense 
missile standard vehicle-mounted launcher (SVML).  In essence, a Stinger missile 
launcher replaced the TOW (tube launched optically tracked wire guided) missile 
launcher on an M2A2 Bradley turret.  This, along with added targeting and fire control 
capabilities, were the only requirements for the system integration (Jones, 1996, pp. 33-
34).   
In his 1996 Master’s Thesis, Walter Jones conducted a case study on the WRAP 
process based on the experience of the BSFV-E.  Although relatively simple in terms of 
the development effort, this program provides key lessons for a successful rapid 
acquisition.  First and foremost, it demonstrated the importance of funding.  Although 
this seems an obvious point, the program was approved for the WRAP program, but the 
Army did not budget money toward the effort.  This program only succeeded because the 
                                                 
5 TRADOC is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 
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Program Executive Officer for Tactical missiles personally sponsored the program, 
funding it from within his own organization (pp. 55-60).  As Jones pointed out, the PPBS 
(since renamed the PPBES for Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
System) is not structured to rapidly fund WRAP programs (p. 57).  This indicates that for 
rapid acquisition programs to be successful, they must acquire funding from a non-
standard source such as reprogrammed funds or supplemental appropriations. 
Jones also determined that the WRAP process cannot be applied to every 
acquisition program.  In summary, he concluded that the WRAP process can be 
successfully applied to programs with five specific characteristics.  First, a working 
solution must exist that meets an urgent Army need using mature technology or a non-
developmental item such as a COTS solution.  Second, the program must be small in size 
and potentially allow for reprogramming of funds.  Third, the materiel solution must be 
supported by strong advocates from both the user and developer communities.  Fourth, 
the program must utilize fixed-type price contracts and contract incentives associated 
with key program or milestone events to spur contractors forward.  Finally, the program 
must be low production quantity or exercise the use of exercisable contract options as a 
means of building upon success (pp. 71-72). 
5. A Recent Case Study on an Accelerated Acquisition 
In their 2005 MBA Professional Report, James Conatser and Vincent Grizio 
detailed the accelerated acquisition and deployment of the Force XXI Battle Command 
Brigade and Below—Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2-BFT) system in support of 
Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.  In simplified terms, this system provides an 
integrated, digital command and control capability across all battlefield functional areas 
and from the squad/platform to the brigade/regimental level (p. 9). 
This program provides a different scenario for rapid acquisition in which the need 
was previously identified, a requirements document was already approved, and the 
system was progressing through the development process.  In this case, the combination 
of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with capability demonstrated in limited user 
tests and advanced warfighting experiments, effectively made the capability an urgent 
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operational need.  Rather than use the approved LRIP run to conduct the Initial 
Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E), the Army instead chose to immediately field 
more than 1,000 systems to deployed and deploying units.  
Conatser and Grizio (2005) determined that the success of this accelerated effort 
relied on four program characteristics.  First, this program had a relatively mature 
technical solution to fill a capability gap.  Second, user representatives were willing to 
accept a useful solution in the short term while the program management office continued 
to develop the system to its desired end state.  Third, the effort had the support of senior 
military leadership at the Service Chief, Combatant Commander, and MDA level.  
Finally, the program had a sufficient funding stream in both the short and long term.  
Although this program was at a point in development that facilitated its transition to rapid 
deployment, Conatser and Grizio (2005) feel that these four criteria apply to any rapid 
acquisition effort in support of contingency operations (pp. 49-50).  
6. The Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) 
Based on legislative guidance and the Service-specific limits of the Service rapid 
acquisition processes, the Office of the Secretary of Defense moved to establish an 
overarching process to meet Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs) of a joint nature.  
IWNs are Joint Urgent Operational Needs that require resolution and fielding in 120 days 
or less.  As described by Middleton, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
directed the formation of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) in September 2004 and 
subsequently moved to formalize the procedures that the group would follow.  This 
process culminated on July 15, 2005, with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction 3470.01 (CJCSI 3470.01) (Middleton, 2006, pp. 13-19).  This instruction 
“establishes policy and procedures to facilitate assessment, validation, sourcing, 
resourcing, and fielding of operationally driven urgent, execution-year combatant 
commander needs” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, p. 1).  It also describes 




resolving combatant commander validated IWNs and for providing a single point of 
contact and accountability on the OSD staff for tracking the timeliness of actions (pp. 1-
4).  
The JRAC process applies only to joint needs that are outside the scope of 
existing DoD 5000 Series and previously discussed Service processes.  It is intended to 
complement, rather than replace or compete with, any existing Service or joint process.  
As with the others, the JRAC process has limits and can only be used to field ACAT II, 
III, or IV programs (p. 2).   
Middleton (2006) conducted a thorough review of the JRAC process by providing 
its detailed history, a breakdown of the cell members, and a recent case example in which 
the process was used to meet a JUONS.  He analyzed the process from the perspective of 
10 value centers.  His analysis determined the JRAC process is value added in several 
areas.  First, it holds powerful budgetary options and an ability to access all colors of 
money.6  Second, the process is handled directly by senior level officials, thereby 
eliminating several layers of bureaucracy.  Third, the process provides portfolio balance 
that reduces Service overlap.  Fourth, it provides an acquisition strategy that aligns 
closely with overarching DoD strategies such as JCIDS and COTS procurement.  Fifth, it 
provides impartiality since funding follows the solution.  Sixth, the process provides 
focus based on the JRAC’s involvement only with rapid acquisitions.  Finally, the 
process acknowledges the evolving nature of war as it shows the DoD can adapt quickly 
and provide needed capabilities rapidly.  He found the process non-value added in terms 
of lifecycle costs given the lack of analysis on long-term maintenance, training and 
resourcing, and based on the lack of a mechanism to incorporate feedback from the 
warfighter.  In terms of acquisition speed, he found the process value added in that it 
establishes deadlines for immediate warfighter need validation and solution but is non-
value added in that it sets no limit or goal for fielding nor any penalty for not meeting 
limits or goals (Middleton, 2006, pp. 57-59). 
                                                 
6 “Color of Money” is a term commonly used within DoD to identify appropriations by type (e.g., 
Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, RDT&E, Military Personnel Expenses, and Military 
Construction).  Once Congress appropriates funds into these separate accounts, money cannot be 
transferred between accounts without being re-appropriated (Jones & McAffery, 2008, pp. 350-351). 
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D. SUMMARY 
Based on the research assessed, several trends are evident in successful rapid 
acquisition programs, both prior to and since the start of the Global War on Terror.  First, 
this research indicates that a materiel solution must be present as a COTS or non-
developmental item to allow rapid procurement.  Second, the solution must be accepted 
by both the senior leadership within the DoD and by the user community.  Finally, the 
program must have a reliable funding stream.  All of these have been critical to the 
MRAP’s success. 
This research also reveals another issue of even more significance to the MRAP 
program: the limits placed on all current rapid acquisition processes by law and DoD 
acquisition regulations and instructions.  As all processes are limited to ACAT II and 
lesser programs, the ACAT I level MRAP program was forced to progress under the 
standard Acquisition Management and JCIDS framework, albeit in a highly tailored 
manner and with rare, non-standard Congressional funding actions.  As we will 
demonstrate, however, the principles behind existing rapid acquisition processes can be 
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III. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND CONTRACTING 
STRATEGY 
A. EARLY PROGRAM HISTORY  
On October 26, 2006, CENTCOM combined two separate Urgent Universal 
Needs Statements (UUNS) for 185 and 1000 vehicles, respectively, into a single Joint 
Universal Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) for 1185 MRAPs.  Two weeks later, on 
November 9, MARCORSYSCOM released the first RFP to industry and on December 6, 
2006, officially established the MRAP JPO.  Ten manufacturers responded to the 
proposal and submitted bids.  Nine of those manufacturers were subsequently awarded 
IDIQ7 contracts on January 26, 2007 with immediate production orders for a minimum 
number of prototype vehicles for testing.  Of the nine awarded contracts, two failed to 
meet contract requirements and were removed from the program prior to testing.  The 
initial test phase started for at least one manufacturer in February 2007 and continued 
through that April for other manufacturers.  This initial testing, conducted at Aberdeen 
Proving Ground, MD, focused heavily on threshold survivability requirements and 
eliminated two more manufacturers due to failure in meeting minimum survivability or 
usability requirements.  The early decision to use multiple manufacturers proved sound 
because the increasing requirement outpaced the industrial capacity of any one 
                                                 
7 Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ):  The indefinite-delivery contract may be used to 
acquire supplies and/or Services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not 
known at the time of contract award.  The IDIQ contract offers the following advantages:  
Flexibility in both quantities and delivery scheduling 
Ordering of supplies or Services after requirements materialize 
Indefinite-quantity contracts limit the Government’s obligation to the minimum quantity specified in 
the contract 
Requirements contracts may permit faster deliveries when production lead time is involved, because 
contractors are usually willing to maintain limited stocks when the Government will obtain all of its actual 
purchase requirements from the contractor  
Indefinite-delivery contracts may provide for any appropriate cost or pricing arrangement.  Cost or 
pricing arrangements that provide for an estimated quantity of supplies or Services (e.g., estimated number 
of labor hours) must comply with the appropriate procedures (FAR, 2008, p. 396).  All MRAP IDIQ 
contracts were firm fixed price (FFP) contracts. 
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manufacturer to produce that many vehicles.  By May 2007 the requirement grew to 
7,774 vehicles; by September of that year the requirement increased again to 15,374.  
1. Need Identification 
In the months following the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the military 
transitioned into an occupying force responsible for establishing security and assisting in 
government reconstruction and nation-building efforts.  Shortly thereafter, insurgents 
turned to the improvised explosive device (IED) as their weapon of choice against U.S. 
and coalition forces.  IEDs were cheap, unsophisticated, plentiful, easy to employ, and 
often produced devastating and catastrophic results.  By 2005, IED related casualties 
were the number one killer in Iraq, prompting DoD to find a solution.  
In 2006, consensus began to form within the Marine Corps and CENTCOM that 
MRAPs were needed in response to the IED threat.  On May 21, 2006, the MNF-W 
Commander in Iraq submitted an urgent universal need request for 185 MRAP vehicles 
and followed with another request for 1,000 additional vehicles on July 10, 2006.  
Designation of these requests as a JUONS by the CENTCOM commander on October 26, 
2006, clearly established the warfighters’ need and effectively started the MRAP 
program. 
The perceived reluctance within the DoD to accept the MRAP as a materiel 
solution to the IED threat is one of the most controversial and criticized aspects of the 
MRAP program.  Such criticisms, however, overlook the escalating actions the DoD took 
from 2004 through 2006 in response to the numerous escalating threats.  Lieutenant 
General (Retired) Joseph L. Yakovac, Jr., the former Military Deputy to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, points out that the 
DoD undertook numerous initiatives early-on to include fragmentation kits, up-armored 
HMMWVs, bar armor, and the JIEDDO in response to the range of threats.  In addition, 
no consensus existed within the user community, and particularly within the Army, on 




Regardless, the purpose of this research is not to analyze the acquisition process before, 
but rather to examine the process after the need was validated and the MRAP program 
was established.   
2. Requirement validation 
The JUONS designation led to program start-up and release of the first RFP on 
November 9, 2006, followed shortly thereafter by official establishment of the JPO in 
December 2006.  Figure 3, below, shows the chronology of the requirements validation 
from the initial 1,185 to the final total of 15,374 vehicles in September 2007.  This 
demonstrates the explosive growth and initial uncertainty as the program transitioned 
from an ACAT III program to an ACAT ID program and one of the largest in the DoD. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Chronology of Requirement Validation  
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 3) 
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On May 2, 2007, the JROC, chaired by Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved an MRAP Capability Production 
Document (CPD), formally setting the size of the required MRAP fleet at 7,774 vehicles.  
This approval, which precedes procurement actions for standard programs, came less 
than two months after the military Services detailed their collective need for MRAP 
vehicles, an extraordinarily rapid pace in formalizing a new need for a large weapon 
system program (Sherman, 2007, May 17).  Even more extraordinary, however, was that 
at this point in the MRAP program, testing was underway for seven competing 
manufacturers and production contracts had already been awarded to five companies.  
B. PROGRAM STRATEGY 
1. Acquisition Strategy 
The acquisition strategy was formed in support of three primary program 
objectives:  first, field survivable, mission capable vehicles; second, field them as rapidly 
as possible; and third, grow the industrial base while simultaneously managing all aspects 
of the acquisition process.  The PM considered all other factors trade-able in support of 
those objectives.  The JPO planned to achieve this through parallel execution of as many 
elements of the acquisition framework as feasibly possible.  Given the nature of the 
requirement and the dire need for a survivable system, the decision was made not to 
restrict innovation by demanding a single COTS solution, but to solicit industry and see 
what different solutions an expanded industrial base could provide (Hansen, 2008, May 
30).  To incentivize multiple vendors, the strategy included use of multiple IDIQ 
contracts followed by phased, rapid testing focused on threshold requirements.  This 
phased testing served as a form of source selection that led to rapid award of multiple 
production orders.  The use of multiple manufacturers required an intensive contractor 
management effort and centralized integration process.  Finally, the rapid fielding 
without sustainment systems in place required a contractor logistics support (CLS) 
approach (Owen, 2008, pp. 6-8).   
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If a vendor chose to develop a new design, the JPO stipulated that it had to be 
produced within 60 days of contract award.  One manufacturer, IMG, did design and 
produce a new and different testable prototype within the 60-day window.  The remainder 
of the manufacturers chose a modern adaptation of a mature, COTS, 30-year-old materiel 
solution, based on the BAE RG-31.   
2. Tailored Acquisition Approach 
By January 31, 2007, the MRAP program had grown into an ACAT II program, a 
designation that would keep the procurement under the Navy’s purview.  However, by 
February 8, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(USDAT&L), Kenneth Krieg, recognized the scope of the MRAP program would grow 
significantly.  Accordingly, he directed the Navy acquisition executive who was 
overseeing the MRAP program, Dr. Delores Etter, to plan for MRAP transition to ACAT 
ID status (Sherman, 2007, March 15).  ACAT-ID designations are reserved for programs 
with procurement costs greater than $2.19 billion (FY 2000 constant dollars), and are 
overseen by the OSD (Under Secretary of Defense, 2003b, p. 21).  Dr. Etter said she 
approved a “tailored plan” for the MRAP program documentation and added that “the 
MRAP office is making progress to get all program documentation in place to support a 
joint acquisition by the Army and Marine Corps” (Sherman, 2007, March 15).  The 
tailored plan granted leeway to the MRAP program, allowing simultaneous execution of 
all facets of the DoD acquisition framework.   
Despite the MRAP program’s tailored approach, it was not granted waivers for 
any of the normal DoD acquisition documentation or required processes.  DoD 
acquisitions are characterized by slow, deliberate and well-documented processes 
intended to ensure a thorough and complete system design.  In many ways, the MRAP 
program was no different, despite its rapid execution.  As an example, all programs 
require a Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) prior to the Milestone C decision to 
verify that a system is technologically mature and ready for fielding.  Due to the rapid 
nature of the MRAP program and its use of vehicles considered COTS, the JPO did not 
complete a technology readiness assessment and requested a waiver of this requirement.  
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For rationale, the JPO argued that MRAP was a mature design based on 30-year-old 
technology—it is basically an armored truck.  The MDA and OSD staff declined the 
waiver, requiring the JPO to petition the Office of Naval Research for a TRA on a system 
that was already fielded and proven in use in Iraq and Afghanistan (Hansen, 2008, May 
30).  
C. PROGRAM EXECUTION 
The JPO implemented its acquisition strategy through a tailored approach to the 
acquisition framework.  It began by leveraging FPII’s existing, active production line 
with a sole-source contract for immediate production.  This started production on a 
proven vehicle design and expanded the industrial base by ramping up a production 
facility.  Next, a RFP was released to industry in an attempt to get as many respondents 
as possible, with the intent of leveraging their combined production capabilities as 
quickly as possible.  Upon receiving bids from ten manufacturers, the JPO performed a 
technical review and assigned risk to the various manufacturers and their designs.  IDIQ 
contracts were subsequently awarded to nine companies with immediate production 
orders for test vehicles.8  In addition, the JPO awarded larger production orders under 
LRIPs9 1 and 2 in February 2007 to the five manufacturers considered low-risk.  These 
orders, placed prior to testing, represent deliberate risk acceptance by the PM in an effort 
to initiate production on vehicles considered likely to meet minimum requirements.  The 
high risk manufacturers, on the other hand, did not receive LRIP contracts until they 
                                                 
8 The initial production orders called for two prototypes per vehicle category (CAT I and II only) per 
manufacturers.  (9 manufacturers x 2 prototypes x 2 categories = 36 vehicles in the initial production 
orders.) 
9 As defined by AR 70-1, LRIP (Low rate initial production) is: 
 1. The first effort of the Production and Deployment (P&D) phase.  The purpose of this effort is to 
establish an initial production base for the system, permit an orderly ramp-up sufficient to lead to a smooth 
transition to full rate production (FRP), and to provide production representative articles for Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) and full-up live fire testing. This effort concludes with a Full 
Rate Production Decision Review (FRPDR) to authorize Full Rate Production and Deployment (FRP&D). 
 2. The minimum number of systems (other than ships and satellites) to provide production 
representative articles for Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), to establish an initial production base 
and to permit an orderly increase in the production rate sufficient to lead to full rate production (FRP) upon 
successful completion of operational testing (OT). For major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs), LRIP 
quantities in excess of 10 percent of the acquisition objective must be reported in the Selected Acquisition 
Report (SAR) (Department of the Army, 2003, p.82). 
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successfully passed the threshold requirements of the initial test phase.  Testing included 
survivability, automotive, safety, and user tests; results were subsequently used in part as 
source selection criteria.  The manufacturers that successfully passed threshold 
requirements for the first test phase (DT-C1) were awarded production orders under a 
series of LRIP contracts.  Figure 4 shows a comparison of the tailored MRAP acquisition 

























Figure 4.   Comparison of MRAP Acquisition Strategy and a Traditional Acquisition 
Framework 
 
On May 2, 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates designated the MRAP as the number 
one DoD procurement priority (Young, Greenwalt, & Hoover, 2007, p. 2).  This 
effectively made MRAP the widely accepted materiel solution at a time when the 
warfighter and user communities were not yet in consensus on a single solution, let alone 
the MRAP.  In a sense, the top-driven emphasis placed the requirements generation 
process in the hands of the acquisition community, rather than users.  This represents a 
trade-off in that not all users got the solution they wanted.  In addition, warfighters did 
not necessarily get the best overall solution because of this lack of defined requirement. 
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As the Joint Program Manager Paul Mann stated, the MRAP program was, “a program of 
adequacy.  Adequacy in this sense is good” (personal communication, September 8, 
2008). 
On June 1, 2007, Secretary Gates assigned the MRAP program a “DX” rating 
under the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (Young et al., 2007, p. 5).  Together, 
the prioritization and DX designation gave the MRAP program the highest priority 
concerning parts and material suppliers in the government and private sector.  Combined 
with the early risk acceptance and tailored acquisition approach, Secretary Gates’ 
emphasis further streamlined the MRAP program and mobilized all resources in its 
support.  This section of the report focuses on the execution of the program from its start 
through the time of this writing, with specific emphasis on the key aspects of the tailored 
MRAP acquisition approach. 
1. Concurrency 
“The early program objective to have significant numbers of MRAP vehicles 
fielded by the end of calendar year 2007 forced the program to plan for and manage all 
aspects of the process simultaneously rather than sequentially.  That included contracting, 
testing, integration, transportation to theater and fielding” (Owen, 2008, p.6).  Within the 
defense acquisition framework, from concept refinement through disposal, each step is 
designed to be executed in series.  The MRAP program executed all steps in parallel, 
making it faster but very difficult to manage.  For example, the MRAP program 
simultaneously conducted developmental testing, operational testing, production, 
integration, fielding, and disposal, while also refining requirements to account for an 
increasing Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) threat and greater need in the restrictive 
terrain of Afghanistan.  This complicated management because the JPO could not focus 
on any one phase within the acquisition framework at any given time.  Additionally, 
milestones could not be followed in their normal, sequential manner.  Yet all processes 
and documentation were still required (Hansen, 2008, June 10). 
Typically, ACAT I programs have an Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement 
(APBA) approved by the MDA prior to entering the procurement phase; this was not the 
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case for the MRAP program due to its extraordinarily rapid maturation as an ACAT I 
program.  The APBA that was approved at the lowest level–by Vice Admiral Steve 
Stanley, Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment for the Joint Staff, who 
was not the MDA–was not linked to any requirement.  Secretary Young, the USDAT&L, 
ultimately approved the program’s APBA on June 16, 2008, but by that time more than 
9,000 vehicles had already been produced, with approximately 5,000 more under 
contract.  At that point, requirements for only 1,595 of the total 15,374 remained unfilled.  
Programs revolve around money, and programs cannot plan their budgets or Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) forecast unless they have a valid requirement (Hansen, 
2008, June 10).  Without the APBA, there is no link to a requirement for which to justify 
a budget, yet the MRAP program was able to purchase nearly the full production run 
without an approved APBA or full rate production (FRP) decision. 
The MRAP program CPD approval provides an additional example.  The CPD, a 
requirements document needed prior to the Milestone C decision, precedes acquisition 
actions such as the FRP decision.  Yet, for the MRAP program, testing was underway for 
seven manufacturers, with production contracts awarded to five companies for over 2,000 
vehicles, before approval of an MRAP CPD.  Such “leaning forward” and tailoring of the 
acquisition process was common throughout the program. 
2. LRIP vs. FRP  
Acquisition programs require a FRP decision by the MDA prior to entering into 
full production.  Until that decision is approved, programs are limited by regulation to 
producing no more than 10% of their total acquisition objective.  Two requirements for 
this decision are the operational test and evaluation reports and live fire test and 
evaluation reports.  As of May 30, 2008, the MRAP program did not have those reports 
and therefore did not have a FRP decision.  However, of a production objective of 15,374 
vehicles, 14,146 were either already produced or on contract, greatly surpassing the LRIP 
restriction of 10% (Hansen, 2008, May 30).  The JPO accomplished this through a series 
of MDA-approved LRIP purchases, another example of the tailored approach.  Despite 
moving forward with production without the normally required documentation, the JPO 
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nevertheless committed to producing that documentation for future reference by working 
with the appropriate agencies such as the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
(DOT&E) to produce the required documentation.  As the Deputy PM, Dave Hansen 
noted, following the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and despite the lack of a long term 
sustainment plan for the MRAP, the Services will keep some MRAP vehicles.  The FRP 
documentation, with live fire and operational test and evaluation data, will give hard, 
factual evidence for which vehicles are worth keeping in the inventory (Hansen, 2008, 
June 10).   
 
The history of LRIP purchases of MRAP vehicles is as follows:  
January 26, 2007 Award of nine competitive IDIQ contracts 
February 9, 2007 Milestone C Decision 
February 14, 2007 LRIP 1, contract awarded for 215 FPII and BAE vehicles 
February 23, 2007 LRIP 2, contract awarded for 180 OTC (Oshkosh Truck  
    Company), PVI (Protected Vehicles, Inc.) and GDLS  
    vehicles 
April 23, 2007  LRIP 3, contract awarded for 1,000 FPII vehicles 
June 19, 2007  LRIP 5, contract awarded for 471 FPII and IMG vehicles 
June 28, 2007  LRIP 6, contract awarded for 441 BAE vehicles 
July 13, 2007  LRIP 7, contract awarded for 1,925 AH and IMG vehicles 
August 10, 2007 LRIP 8, contract awarded for 725 FPII and GDLS vehicles 
September 6, 2007 Program designated ACAT 1D 
October 18, 2007 LRIP 9, contract awarded for 2,400 FPII, BAE and IMG  
    vehicles 
 33
December 18, 2007 LRIP 10, contract awarded for 3,126 FPII, BAE, BAE- 
    TVS10, and IMG vehicles 
March 14, 2008 LRIP 11, contract awarded for 2,243 FPII, BAE, BAE- 
    TVS, and IMG vehicles  
May 2, 2008  LRIP 11, contract awarded for 40 BAE vehicles 
(Mann, 2008, slide 31) 
July 17, 2008  LRIP 12, contract awarded for 773 GDLS vehicles  
September 4, 2008 LRIP 13, contract awarded for 822 IMG vehicles  
(D. Hansen, personal communication, October 14, 2008) 
LRIPs 12 and 13 consisted of the relatively small GDLS RG-31 Mk5e and the 
smaller, lighter, more maneuverable version of the IMG MaxxPro vehicle known as the 
MaxxPro Dash.  Destined for the restrictive terrain of Afghanistan, these vehicles were 
selected based on the need for better off-road capability and greater maneuverability in 
that environment.  These final LRIP orders also demonstrate the evolving requirement 
that shifted from focus on the threat in Iraq to the increased threat in Afghanistan. 
3. Source Selection 
The MRAP source selection process included two phases.  The first phase 
consisted of a technical evaluation conducted by a source selection panel–not unlike the 
source selection process for any normal program.  The criteria consisted of an 
engineering design review, cost realism determination, a fair and reasonableness cost 
determination, manufacturing processes and facilities evaluation, and past performance 
review.  The source selection committee assigned risk to the manufacturers based on the 
technical evaluation.  For example, Oshkosh Truck Company (OTC) was rated low-risk 
because it offered a low-risk design; its cost and pricing information was determined fair 
and reasonable; it had modern and adequate manufacturing facilities; and it had favorable 
recent and relevant performance in government contracts.  IMG, on the other hand, was 
                                                 
10 Following BAE purchase of Armor Holdings (AH), AH vehicles were produced under the BAE 
Tactical Vehicle Solutions (BAE-TVS) subsidiary. 
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rated a higher risk because of both its unique and unproven bolt-together design, and 
because it had no governmental past performance record.  In addition, IMG had no 
experience with armored vehicles and depended on a foreign supplier as its source of 
armor.  Based on the source selection analysis and because the urgent nature of the 
program demanded many vehicles, the PM awarded IDIQ contracts to nine of the ten 
competing manufacturers, including even high-risk manufacturers such as IMG.  The 
IDIQ contracts included immediate production orders for a minimum number of 
prototype vehicles for testing.  Only one manufacturer was eliminated at this point based 
on the committee’s determination that it had no chance of successfully contributing to the 
program.   
The second component of source selection consisted of the first phase of 
developmental testing, known as DT-C1.  Focused heavily on survivability—with a 
minimum level of user, safety, and automotive testing—this phase served as a screening 
process for the first round of large LRIP orders.  Of the nine manufacturers on contract to 
deliver test vehicles, two failed to provide the vehicles within the 60-day requirement, 
and two more failed to pass threshold survivability specifications.  One low-risk 
manufacturer, OTC, was eliminated from the program in this phase of testing, whereas 
IMG passed and, following further testing, went on to become the largest MRAP 
producer.  Of the five manufacturers that successfully passed the DT-C1 requirements, all 
were awarded large LRIP orders.  This source selection approach allowed the JPO to 
quickly identify suitable vehicles, get them into production, and then steer future 
production orders to certain manufacturers once future phases of testing could better 
inform the source selection.   
The decision to maximize participation and the associated competition was 
arguably costly; however, it improved the end product by bringing innovation to the 
program.  IMG, which was initially deemed a high-risk manufacturer, brought both an 
innovative design and a manufacturing capability unequalled in the program, providing 
the best example of a successful and rapid expansion of the industrial base in support of 
the requirement.  OTC failure in the first phase of testing and subsequent removal from 
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the program demonstrates the inherently increased risk involved with relying only  
on low-risk manufacturers in a rapid program. 
4. Contracting Strategy and Management 
The contracting strategy mirrored the acquisition strategy by executing as many 
steps of the contracting process as possible in parallel rather than series.  The MRAP JPO 
contracting team started the process by awarding a sole-source contract to FPII for 288 
Cougar vehicles, while simultaneously issuing an RFP to industry.  The JPO did this in 
order to leverage an active production line and start production immediately, while also 
beginning to mobilize the industrial base.  This competitive approach provided several 
important benefits.  For one, it spurred innovation in that the JPO accepted different 
designs as long as they could meet or exceed a minimum survivability requirement.  In 
addition, a $100,000 incentive per vehicle for early delivery of test vehicles motivated the 
manufacturers to deliver test vehicles earlier than their proposed schedules (2008, Owen, 
p.11).  The JPO contracting office also incentivized speed in delivery by establishing the 
order of testing based on order of delivery.  For example, the first manufacturer to deliver 
vehicles for testing, FPII, was the first to begin DT-C1 testing.  The first manufacturer to 
complete this testing was also the first awarded an LRIP contract.  To further add 
leverage, the JPO made no guarantee that all manufacturers that did deliver would be 
awarded a production contract, thereby creating a winner-take-all possibility.  Although 
all manufacturers that eventually passed testing were awarded LRIP contracts, 
manufacturers did not know that there would be multiple contracts at the time of testing.  
In fact, each contract had a 4,100 vehicle ceiling per year, with the intent of having 
enough production capacity under any one contract for the possible award of the entire 
requirement (then 4,066 vehicles) to a single manufacturer (Owen, 2008, p.11).  This 
further incentivized the manufacturers to deliver first. 
The initial approach of issuing IDIQ contracts followed by production orders to 
low-risk manufacturers prior to testing, although costly, accomplished two tasks.  First, 
by buying all rather than a portion of the minimum amounts from each manufacturer, the 
Government fulfilled the obligations of the IDIQ contracts.  This reduced the risk of 
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protest or complaint over unfilled orders.  Second, assuming the low-risk manufacturers 
would pass testing, the early production orders enabled easy transition into full 
production because those manufacturers were already ramping up for production.  Of the 
nine manufacturers awarded IDIQ contracts for test vehicles, the source selection 
committee assessed five as acceptably low in risk to receive LRIP contracts prior to 
testing.  Although two of these manufacturers ultimately failed, three of the five that did 
meet DT-C1 requirements completed that phase of testing more prepared for production 
than if starting from scratch.  This example demonstrates the risk acceptance and 
associated trade-off with this aspect of the acquisition approach.  In exchange for an 
accelerated ramp-up of three MRAP manufacturers, the program bought 160 vehicles 
from OTC and Protected Vessels, Inc. (PVI), at a cost of $23 million, that it couldn’t 
ultimately use (Hansen, 2008, June 10).   
An additional aspect of the contracting strategy, intended to maximize program 
participation, allowed contractors to mitigate some of their production risks, performance 
risks and start-up costs by including all those costs up front in higher per-vehicle prices 
for lower order quantities.  This stepladder pricing was considered one of the most 
valuable business attributes of the contracting strategy, yet it is a practice not condoned in 
traditional acquisition programs.  In addition, it helped limit the Government’s liability in 
the event of a contract termination (Owen, 2008, p. 11).  Alpha11 contracting was another 
tool used successfully in that it saved both time and money by establishing costs and 
prices with vendors up front.  This became apparent with the large volume of 
undefinitized contract actions (UCAs), engineering change proposals (ECPs), 
amendments, and modifications because time consuming negotiations did not have to be 
 
 
                                                 
11 There is no formal definition of Alpha Contracting.  It is a theory of acquisition reform and in the 
case of the MRAP program applied in a hybrid form due to the use of multiple manufacturers.  Defined by 
Clements (2002, p. 58), “Alpha Contracting is a method of sole-source contracting that capitalizes on the 
teaming of the Government and the contractor early and throughout all stages of the acquisition process. It 
differs from the traditional sole-source contracting method in that it includes the contractor in the planning 
and development of the contract from the beginning of the process, thereby reducing the overall time to 
contract award.”  
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conducted for each change, variant, or vendor.  Additionally, it helped create a long term 
partnership rather than the win-lose adversarial relationship that can occur with 
traditional negotiations. 
The multiple-award, IDIQ, test and production acquisition strategy effectively 
implemented the concept of “competitive prototyping” to expedite vehicle delivery, 
foster competition and innovation, and provide the maximum amount of ordering 
flexibility available.  In short, competitive prototyping sped delivery of MRAP vehicles 
to warfighters and led to an ever-improving product.  Recognition of the advantages 
produced by competitive prototyping have since resulted in a mandate by the 
USDAT&L, John Young (2007), that all acquisition strategies requiring USDAT&L  
approval will require competitive, technically mature prototyping through the milestone 
B decision. 
In spite of the contracting strategy successfully employed for the MRAP program, 
the lead JPO contracting officer pointed out the challenges involved.  Primarily, the 
program lacked enough trained people do to contract work given the size of the task (L. 
Frazier, personal communication, July 28, 2008).  At peak operation, twenty-three 
personnel were on staff in the JPO contracting office, three of whom were administrative 
rather than contracting specialists.  After peak operation, the number dropped to 14, 
putting significant work load on the remaining personnel.  Navy contracting personnel 
also rotated in and out of the JPO assignment every two months (Mann, 2008, slide 6).  In 
an effort to assist with getting trained and competent people in the contracting office, the 
JPO employed contract specialists under contract from two different organizations.  In 
addition to providing personnel, these contractors also provided buildings and office 
space. 
Another challenging aspect of the contracting process involved managing 
amendments (L. Frazier, personal communication, July 28, 2008).  The dynamic nature 
of the program required numerous amendments in three broad categories of logistics, 
testing, and ECPs.  These three amendment categories, combined with five different 
manufacturers, each with multiple variants, increased the amount of contract work 
dramatically.  Examples of contract amendments for the MRAP program were as follows: 
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• Logistics–Initial contracts included no logistical plans due to the speed with 
which they were awarded.  The contracts were amended after the initial 
award. 
• Testing–Changes due to testing included additions to product verification 
testing and plans for successive test phases.  These changes were necessary 
due to the evolving nature of the test and evaluation master plan (TEMP). 
• ECPs–All ECPs were executed as a form of letter contract or UCA, meaning 
the contractors were awarded a contract for immediate production with all 
cost and pricing data agreed to as a “not-to-exceed” amount.  This amount had 
to be definitized or finalized at a later specified date.  
5. Program Evolution 
Sustainment for the MRAP program was initially contracted from each 
manufacturer through a contractor logistics support (CLS) agreement to include parts and 
field service representatives (FSRs).  Within a short amount of time, the requirement for 
the number of MRAPs grew from 1,185 to 4,066 vehicles, and then again quickly 
changed to 7,774.  With projections of an eventual requirement for more than 10,000 
MRAPs, the JPO realized by the early summer of 2007 that a pure CLS approach would 
not be feasible given the widely decentralized operations in Iraq.  This necessitated 
contract renegotiations for factors such as Engineering Data for Provisioning (EDFP) and 
cross-training of FSRs to work on all vehicle variants as the strategy changed to reflect a 
hybrid/organic approach to sustainment. 
Vehicle modifications dealt mostly with GFE initially.  As GFE packages 
stabilized, modifications required during integration were incorporated at the 
manufacturer level, streamlining the integration effort.  For example, IMG vehicles 
initially took up to four days for a full GFE integration, making it one of the most time-
intensive integration requirements.  IMG implemented approximately 30 ECPs based on 
interaction with SPAWAR, the GFE integrator, reducing the integration time to 
approximately four hours per vehicle (Major, 2008, August 22).  As the program 
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progressed, it also implemented changes based on soldier feedback and design flaws 
brought to light in the harsh operational environment of Iraq. 
The MRAP program also grew and adapted to reflect the changing tactics of the 
insurgents in Iraq.  Even before the end of the first phase of testing, insurgent use of EFPs 
increased sufficiently to warrant additional survivability measures for MRAP vehicles.  
The MRAP JPO responded with the MRAP expedient armor program (MEAP), which 
basically added additional armor to the sides of the vehicles (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  
The JPO implemented a three-pronged approach to the problem.  First, they added 
additional armor to the existing MRAPs in-theater.  Second, the JPO worked with MRAP 
manufacturers to modify the vehicle designs to allow for quick MEAP installation and to 
handle additional weight.  The additional armor required increasing the gross vehicle 
weight rating (GVWR) and upgrading suspension components.  Third, the JPO solicited 
industry again with a RFP in an MRAP II competition, with the requirement of providing 
survivability against IED and EFP attacks.  Although the JPO contracted for and tested 
MRAP II vehicles, it did not make production orders for a number of reasons, to include 
the additional size and weight, the diminished threat in Iraq through 2008, and the added 
capability given existing MRAP vehicles by the MEAP program.  As the most recent 
evolution of the MRAP program (as of this writing), the JPO is preparing to release 
another RFP to procure an even smaller and lighter MRAP vehicle.  This program, called 
MRAP All Terrain Light Combat Vehicle (MATLCV), is expected to involve 
procurement of about 2,000 additional vehicles and require an approximate $3 billion in 
additional funding (Sherman, 2008). 
D. BUDGET AND FINANCE 
The high-profile and politically charged MRAP program has been funded 
primarily through timely, non-standard methods—namely, supplemental appropriations, 
emergency appropriations, and reprogramming actions.  This is extraordinary because 
most defense acquisition programs are funded long-term through the PPBES and the 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process and short-term through the base DoD 
budget.  The MRAP program was not included in the FY 2007 or FY 2008 base budget 
 40
because it had not been forecast, and therefore the Services had no long- or short-term 
plan for funding.  In addition, through September 2007, the total requirement kept 
changing, making it impossible to provide an accurate budget estimate for FY 2008.  For 
these reasons, the MRAP program relied on reprogramming actions, emergency additions 
to the defense appropriations, and supplemental appropriations.  
A potential issue for the Army and Marine Corps concerning the MRAP program 
is the potential effect on funding for the JLTV program, which is intended to replace the 
HMMWV.  Concerns over redundancy in wheeled vehicle programs led the White House 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to request a long-term strategy update in this 
regard.  As addressed in the DoD Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy released in July 
2008, both the Army and Marine Corps intend to place the majority of their MRAP 
vehicles in war reserves and pre-position stocks (Feickert, 2008).   
When a program under consideration for procurement has no long-term plan, 
financing that effort through normal channels such as the President’s Budget or POM can 
be difficult, if not impossible.  However, MRAP had the political backing of key 
members of Congress, namely Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) and Representative John 
Murtha (D-PA), Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense who, 
among others, assisted in funding the MRAP program though supplemental 
appropriations.  In addition to supplemental funding, the MRAP program received money 
reprogrammed from other systems.  All told, despite not having a long-term plan that 
linked to a formal budget, the MRAP finance office has managed to execute nearly $20 
billion in the form of supplemental funding, emergency funding, and reprogramming 
from other, lower priority programs (Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008a). 
1. Funding Actions 
A list of funding actions in support of the MRAP program follows: 
1. March 28, 2007.  Tina Jonas, the DoD comptroller approved shifting 
$498 million from select Army and Marine Corps procurement accounts 
into others designated “to accelerate the procurement” of MRAP vehicles.  
This reprogramming action tapped into seven budget lines, diverting from 
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programs such as the Army HMMWV program, the Marine Corps 
amphibious assault vehicle, and the Blue Force Tracker program 
(Sherman, 2007, April 26).  
2. April 26, 2007.  Senator Joe Biden introduced an amendment (#739 to the 
Senate Version of the 2007 Supplemental Appropriation Bill) to accelerate 
$1.5 billion in funds for the MRAP program.  The amendment 
subsequently passed (Biden, 2007).  
3. July 17, 2007.  The JPO requested reprogramming actions of $1.165 
billion among various defense appropriations to accelerate the 
procurement of additional MRAP vehicles (Cresswell-Atkinson, 2007). 
4. July 31, 2007.  The White House requested $5.3 billion to purchase 1,520 
MRAP vehicles and provide additional parts for other MRAPs already on 
order.  The funding request was added to the DoD’s $141.7 billion request 
for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the budget year 
beginning October 1, 2007 (Towell, Dagget, & Belasco, 2008, pp. 21-22).   
5. October 3, 2007.  Senator Joe Biden introduced an amendment 
authorizing an additional $23.6 billion for MRAP vehicles (2008, p. 67).  
Senator Biden’s strong and persistent support is notable in that it 
coincided with his unsuccessful run for the presidency. 
6. October 8, 2007.  The chairman of the Senate Appropriation Defense 
Subcommittee pledged to pay for all MRAP vehicles the DoD requested.  
At that point, the DoD had asked Congress for $16.8 billion in FY 2008 
for the MRAP program, enough for 15,374 vehicles.  Of the requested 
MRAP funding, $5.2 billion was secured in a continuing resolution, a 
temporary budget stopgap for the new fiscal year that continued the 
previous year’s funding levels until the defense appropriations bill was 
signed into law (Rutherford, 2007).  
7. October 22, 2007.  The President asked Congress to consider amendments 
to the Presidential budget request for FY 2008 that would provide 
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additional resources for ongoing military and intelligence operations in 
support of OIF, OEF, and other selected international activities.  This 
included $11 billion for the production, fielding, support, and continued 
advancements of MRAP vehicles under equipment, force structure, and 
facilities improvements (Nussle, 2007).  
These examples show the continuous efforts to establish and support the MRAP 
program’s requirements, as well its significant political support.  This political support 
was instrumental in the rapid funding the program received through non-standard actions, 
(i.e., Congressional approval of reprogramming, supplemental appropriations, and 
emergency additions to the base defense appropriation).  Figure 5 provides the 
breakdown of all funding requests and appropriations through FY 2008.  
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 USMC $0.043 $0.603 $0.428 $0.468 $0.250 $0.585 $0.119 $0.090 $2.694 $0.020 $0.436
 USA         -   $0.020 $0.070 $0.520 $0.250 $0.447 $0.798 $1.764 $11.028 $1.883
 USN $0.130 $0.060 $0.129 $0.008 $0.107 $0.223 $0.093                -   $0.109
 USAF         -            -   $0.015 $0.124 $0.031 $0.128 $0.630                -   $0.106
 SOCOM         -            -   $0.223 $0.036 $0.110 $0.160                -   $0.076
 TOTAL $0.173 $0.663 $0.020 $0.498 $1.355 $0.500 $1.200 $1.165 $0.441 $5.342 $11.047 $2.610
MRAP Vehicle Program Funding Requests & Appropriations
(RDT&E, Procurement and O&M)
Multiple Supplemental Budget Requests, Amendments, ATRs, BTRs, Congressional 
Adds and Cash Flowing ensure Program Financial Success
$22.4B Appropriated Thru FY08
 
Figure 5.   MRAP Vehicle Funding Requests & Appropriations  
(From Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008b). 
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2. Budget Complexity 
The MRAP Vehicle program has been funded by more than $20 billion in 
appropriations across multiple sources and Services.  Because of the size and urgency of 
the program, financial management has received and required a great deal of attention 
from Congress, OSD, the Services and the JPO.  The very nature of this circumstance 
brings several key challenges, one of which is the magnitude and pace of the program, 
including its many changes.  Engineering changes can happen rapidly, as often as the 
threat forces employ innovative approaches to out-maneuver DoD anti-IED efforts.  This 
ultimately affects the funding requirements.  Often in DoD acquisitions, this 
appropriation and apportionment process can take months, but all phases were conducted 
in parallel and thus were compressed into weeks, days, or hours for the MRAP program.  
Execution of this large magnitude of funding across multiple funding accounts must 
occur carefully and quickly to ensure that funds are received and obligated appropriately 
and in a timely manner to support mission requirements at the same time that 
requirements are changing.   In just two fiscal years, the MRAP program executed nearly 
$22 billion for procurement of vehicles, GFE, logistics support, upgrades, facilities, 
transportation to theater and testing across multiple Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air 
Force and SOCOM funding accounts.  Until June 2008, and because there was no APBA, 
all funding obligations legally required separate OSD-level approval prior to execution 
(Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008c).  
As previously discussed, the MRAP program did not have an approved APBA in 
place prior to entering the procurement phase.  Key personnel instead worked quickly to 
develop a streamlined process to receive OSD Obligation Authority and to ensure that 
urgent funding documents were not delayed.  Once the APBA was signed by the MDA in 
June 2008, the program no longer required Obligation Authority signature from the OSD 
(M. Cresswell-Atkinson, personal communication, July 29, 2008).  As of this writing, 
$22.4 billion has been appropriated to the program ($5.6 billion through FY 2007 and 
$16.8 billion in FY 2008) for 15,374 MRAP vehicles.   Of the total appropriations, $22.0 
billion has been transferred to the program for obligation.  Total program funding status 
is shown in Figure 6 and is further broken down by funding line and Service in Figure 7. 
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$M USMC USA USN USAF SOCOM TOTAL
RDT&E $258 $40 $298
Procurement $3,902 $14,354 $690 $887 $765 $20,598
O&M $289 $289
O&M Transportation $151 $538 $38 $46 $57 $830
Total $4,600 $14,932 $728 $933 $822 $22,015 Transferred to Date
$400 Still in Transfer Fund
$22,415 Total Appropriated
Funds Received To Date
 
Figure 6.   Program Fund Status by Per Budget Line  







COA 1 USMC USA USN USAF SOCOM
Total
Spent
Proc- Vehicles $8,247 $1,771 $5,196 $317 $289 $215 $7,787
Proc- Prog/Other $181 $18 $40 $0 $4 $83 $145
Proc- Autom Testing $108 $74 $19 $93
Proc- Initial Spt/Spares/BDAR $4,659 $381 $2,214 $50 $82 $45 $2,774
Proc- GFE $3,505 $682 $1,684 $143 $169 $207 $2,884
Proc- Fielding/Fac $325 $0 $277 $277
Proc- Spirals $3,036 $243 $1,950 $33 $44 $25 $2,295
RDT&E- MRAP I $125 $124 $19 $144
RDT&E- MRAP II $49 $37 $37
RDT&E- Spirals $124 $66 $20 $86
O&M- Log/Facilities $299 $272 $272
O&M- Transportation $830 $120 $438 $25 $10 $57 $650
Total $21,488 $3,789 $11,857 $568 $597 $632 $17,444
% Comm/Service 82% 79% 78% 64% 77% 79%
Total Obligated/Service $3,480 $9,866 $540 $533 $508 $14,927
% Oblig/Service 76% 66% 74% 57% 62% 68%
Funding Status- Per Budget Line
 
Figure 7.   Program Fund Status by Service and Type  
(From Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008a, p.1) 
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3. MRAP Approach to Funding  
In an effort to ensure complicated MRAP transactions occurred in a timely 
fashion, communication and financial processes were streamlined across key JPO, 
Service, OSD and Congressional financial personnel allowing for major funding 
processes and funding obligations to occur in days, and in some cases, hours.  For 
example, several multi-million dollar contract awards were obligated by the JPO within 2 
hours of OMB/OSD funding apportionment.  This is remarkable given the appropriation 
of funds to each of the Services rather than to the JPO.  The program’s priority status and 
high-level attention allowed transfer and consolidation of these funds within a matter of 
minutes (Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008c).   
Another key to the MRAP finance office success was the ability to successfully 
estimate costs and to request, receive, and execute almost $20 billion in less than 18 
months.  Joint cost estimating was carefully managed to understand program financial 
requirements, noted as a critical success by the JPO Director of Budget and Financial 
Management (M. Cresswell-Atkinson, personal communication, July 29, 2008). 
One of the non-routine fiscal initiatives the MRAP finance office created was a 
special “purple account,” or joint transfer account allowing for fiscal severability.  This 
account, called the MRAP Vehicle Fund, was authorized with the passing of Public Law 
110-116, the FY 2008 Defense Appropriation Act.  In addition to appropriating $11.6 
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billion in emergency funding for the MRAP program, Section 812212 of this law 
officially granted authority to the Secretary of Defense to transfer funds for procurement, 
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E), and operations and maintenance 
(O&M) for the program (110th Congress, 2007).  This account and associated procedures 
developed by the JPO finance office allowed for movement of funds to the required 
Service execution accounts with only a five-day notice to OMB and Congress.  In June 
2008, at the request of the JPO finance office, Congress also provided language in the 
2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law 110-25213, which allowed the JPO to 
transfer funds back into the MRAP Vehicle Fund for later transfer into other Service 
appropriation accounts (110th Congress, 2008).  The flexibility of the MRAP Vehicle 
Fund and the transfer back/retransfer ability was a key factor in the program’s financial 
success.  It allowed the JPO financial manager to move financial resources into the right 
Service and appropriation accounts in response to changes in program requirements, with 
continual dialogue in the form of monthly program briefings to Congressional 
appropriation staffers to ensure Congress was kept informed (M. Cresswell-Atkinson, 
personal communication, July 29, 2008).   
                                                 
12 PL 110-116, SEC. 8122. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in addition to amounts 
otherwise made available by this Act, there is appropriated $11,630,000,000 for the ‘‘Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund’’, to remain available until September 30, 2008.  (b) The funds provided 
by subsection (a) shall be available to the Secretary of Defense to continue technological research and 
development and upgrades, to procure Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles and associated support 
equipment, and to sustain, transport, and field Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles.  (c)(1) The 
Secretary of Defense shall transfer funds provided by subsection (a) to appropriations for operation and 
maintenance; procurement; and research, development, test and evaluation to accomplish the purposes 
specified in subsection (b). Such transferred funds shall be merged with and be available for the same 
purposes and for the same time period as the appropriation to which they are transferred.  (2) The transfer 
authority provided by this subsection shall be in addition to any other transfer authority available to the 
Department of Defense.  (3) The Secretary of Defense shall, not less than 5 days prior to making any 
transfer under this subsection, notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of the 
transfer.  (d) The amount provided by this section is designated as an emergency requirement and necessary 
to meet emergency needs pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of section 204 of S. Con. Res.  21 (110th 
Congress), the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2008.  This division may be cited as the 
‘‘Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008’’ (110th Congress, 2007, p.47). 
13 P.L. 110-252, SEC. 9108 amends section 8122(c) of Public Law 110–116 by adding at the end the 
following: ‘‘(4) Upon a determination that all or part of the funds transferred under paragraph (1) are not 
necessary to accomplish the purposes specified in subsection (b), such amounts may be transferred back to 
the ‘Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund’ ’’ (110th Congress, 2008, p.83). 
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Prior to the creation of the MRAP Vehicle Fund, monies dedicated to the MRAP 
program were restricted to their respective appropriation accounts or “color of money.”  
For example, money dedicated or “colored” specifically for procurement could not be 
used for testing and evaluation (T&E), but the program office did just that prior to the 
creation of the special fund.  The “color of money” restrictions would not allow blending 
of funds from one account into another because these controls are intended to ensure that 
each dollar is spent for the purpose appropriated by Congress.  This was restrictive at best 
and unacceptable in a fast moving, highly political program such as MRAP.  The 
appropriation to the “purple” MRAP Vehicle Fund gave the JPO flexibility and earned 
the trust of Congress, allowing the JPO to transfer and obligate funds as needed in 
support of procuring MRAPs.  Figure 8 shows the differences in fund flow for FY 2007 
versus FY 2008 with fiscal severability and the MRAP Vehicle Fund. 
 
     
Figure 8.   FY07 versus FY08 Finance Procedures  
(From M. Cresswell-Atkinson, personal communication, July 29, 2008) 
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Figure 9.   MRAP Vehicle Contract Financial Summary  
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Figure 10.   MRAP Vehicle Contract Funding Status  
(From Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008a, p.4) 
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Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) and Below Threshold Reprogramming 
(BTR) techniques were used to keep production going in FY 2007 and avoid production 
breaks.  When Congress appropriates funding, it is for specific programs and items as 
represented in the budget exhibits.  If the Service funding needs change, they process a 
reprogramming request to transfer funds from one account to another.  There is a 
cumulative threshold per appropriated account under (below) which Services can 
reprogram funding without Congressional approval—this transfer is affected via a BTR 
form.  If the reprogramming need exceeds the threshold, then Congress must approve the 
transfer of funds.   
The BTRs and ATRs ensured the MRAP program had sufficient FY 2007 funding 
to procure the maximum production rates from all qualified vendors for vehicle deliveries 
through February 2008.  The JPO had to procure production through February 2008, 
while in FY 2007, because of production lead times.  Vehicles procured with new FY 
2008 funding (not available to the program until October 2007) would not be delivered 
until March 2008.  Therefore, to procure production through February 2008 and prevent a 
break in production, while in 4th Quarter FY 2007, the JPO relied on ATR and BTR 
reprogramming (M. Cresswell-Atkinson, personal communication, July 29, 2008).   
E. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS 
Analysis of the programmatic and contracting processes applied in the MRAP 
program indicates several factors critical to the JPO success in meeting the program 
objectives.  Chief among these factors was the multiple award, IDIQ, test and production 
acquisition strategy, which was designed with the focused intent of rapidly meeting 
urgent warfighter needs.  This acquisition strategy included a tailored approach to the 
acquisition process, allowing concurrent, rather than sequential, execution of all 
acquisition phases.  It applied competitive prototyping to expedite vehicle delivery, foster 
competition and innovation, and provide maximum ordering flexibility to the PM.  It 
used threshold testing as an initial means of source selection, and it accepted a multiple-
manufacturer approach as a way of rapidly expanding the industrial base and maximizing  
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production capacity.  Finally, the strategy involved identifying low-risk manufacturers 
and awarding production orders prior to testing as a way of ramping up production 
capacity. 
From a contracting perspective, the JPO used multiple IDIQ contracts with 
immediate production orders and performance incentives to motivate manufacturers and 
maximize industry participation.  The contracting strategy also included the use of 
stepladder pricing to allow manufacturers to mitigate start-up, production, and 
performance risk by charging higher per-vehicle prices for smaller orders.  Finally, the 
MRAP contracting team employed alpha contracting as a way of minimizing the 
negotiations involved with UCAs, ECPs, amendments, and other contract modifications 
that were prevalent in the program.  These contracting techniques not only lessened the 
risk of protest and liability for the Government, but also assisted in creating long-term 
partnerships for the program. 
From a budgeting and finance perspective, the MRAP program obviously would 
not have been possible without the tremendous political support of Congress and the 
President, reflected in more than $22 billion in program funding through FY 2008.  This 
political support also led to the creation of one of the most important fiscal initiatives 
implemented by the JPO finance office.  The special transfer account, known as the 
MRAP Vehicle Fund, allowed money normally appropriated to specific accounts to be 
allocated and mixed together without regard to specific appropriation controls at the 
discretion of the program office, permitted by the underlying support of Congress, OMB 
and the DoD comptroller.  This allowed the JPO to quickly obligate funding from all 
Services and provided the flexibility needed to quickly react to the changing program 
requirements. 
The aforementioned factors, which by no means represent a comprehensive list of 
the elements critical to the program success, group into two broad categories.  The first is 
the element of concurrency, which was a key component in the acquisition strategy.  
Simultaneous execution of the normally sequential acquisition phases, combined with 
concurrent and continuous activities within those phases, compressed the program 
acquisition timeline more than any other single factor.  A few examples of concurrency 
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were procurement actions prior to approval of an APBA, simultaneous developmental 
testing and production of vehicles, and continuous refinement of performance 
requirements in response to the evolving threat. 
The second broad category enabling the MRAP program rapid execution, which 
goes hand-in-hand with concurrency, is risk acceptance.  The sequential and deliberate 
defense acquisition framework is designed to minimize risk.  The strategy of concurrency 
therefore represents the most vivid example of risk acceptance in the MRAP program and 
formed the basis for very specific instances of risk acceptance.  For example, by 
awarding production orders prior to threshold and user testing, the PM accepted the risk 
of procuring a small number of vehicles that were ultimately unusable.   In addition, by 
using survivability-focused threshold testing as a form of source selection, the program 
accepted the risk of fielding vehicles that were unreliable and difficult to sustain in an 
operational environment.   
Risk acceptance in any situation does not come without a reciprocal trade-off.  
The MRAP program, therefore, made numerous trade-offs in support of the program 
strategy.  As a first example, the use of multiple manufacturers sped delivery of large 
quantities of vehicles to warfighters, but it did so at the expense of complexity in 
sustainment, increased training requirements for Soldiers and Marines, and higher 
lifecycle costs.  As another example, the award of production contracts prior to threshold 
testing resulted in the procurement of 160 vehicles at a cost of $23 million that were 
ultimately determined unusable in Iraq or Afghanistan; this trade-off should be 
considered, however, with respect to the three successful manufacturers that were 
similarly awarded early production contracts and therefore sped vehicle deliveries to 
warfighters.  Finally, the use of a commercially available solution, as opposed to full-
scale development based on thorough analysis of a user-generated requirement, resulted 
in a vehicle that was adequate, but not ideally suited to the operational environment 
In conclusion, the program’s focus on concurrency and risk acceptance, enabled 




meeting program objectives of fielding as many survivable vehicles as quickly as 
possible while expanding the industrial base.  As subsequent analysis will show, these 
themes permeated every facet of the MRAP program. 
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IV. TESTING AND EVALUATION (T&E)14 
A. T&E PLANNING AND STRATEGY   
Concurrent with the release of the original MRAP RFP in November 2006, 
MARCORSYSCOM and the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity 
(MCOTEA) established a Test Integration Working Group (TIWG) with the Aberdeen 
Test Center (ATC), the Army Research Lab (ARL), and the Director, Operational Test 
and Evaluation (DOT&E).  The purpose of the TIWG was to determine and discuss T&E 
and Title 1015 requirements, T&E funding requirements, and the requisite reports needed 
for rapid fielding.  Through the work of this group and interaction with component 
acquisition agencies, a modified T&E strategy and plan was developed, combining 
developmental, operational, and live fire test events where possible.  In addition, the JPO 
made an early commitment to develop a DoD compliant test and evaluation master plan 
(TEMP) to capture the evolving requirements of the program.  The initial cooperation 
between all stakeholders involved in the T&E effort was instrumental in the success of 
the program, and “the decision to construct an ‘evolving’ TEMP, without the benefit of a 
program CDD or CPD, was instrumental in forging a unified MRAP T&E strategy and 
framework, managing initial T&E risk, and developing the overarching DT 
(developmental testing) and OT (operational testing) activities required by DoD 
regulation or statute” (Owen, 2008, p. 12).  In addition, early construction of this TEMP 
resulted in early cooperation between test agencies and conveyed the overall DT and OT 
plans to key DoD decision-makers, resulting in expedited funding for T&E resources. 
The bulk of developmental testing for MRAP vehicles was conducted at the 
Aberdeen Test Center in Maryland.  This test center is the lead DoD asset for automotive, 
manned and unmanned ground vehicle, gun and munitions, and live fire vulnerability and 
lethality testing (Aberdeen Test Center, 2008, August 17).  COL John Rooney, who took 
                                                 
14 Unless otherwise cited, the information from this section was drawn largely from an interview with 
the Aberdeen Test Center Commander (Rooney, 2008, August 7).  
15 Title 10 of the U.S. Code is the law governing all aspects of the armed forces. 
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command of the test center in June 2005, was involved with the first bolt-on armor kits 
that were the initial solution to the IED threat.  As such, he has been involved with the 
MRAP program from its start and has been instrumental to its success.  
COL Rooney first learned of the MRAP program in November 2006 during a 
conversation with Paul Mann, who became the MRAP Joint Program Manager that 
December.  Upon learning of the scope, timing, and priority of the program, COL 
Rooney immediately began planning for the testing.  He determined that an approximate 
250-member team would be required, and he started building this team from within his 
2,000-member organization, as well as hiring new personnel to backfill for these new 
positions.  He also analyzed the scope of the program and determined two major 
shortfalls in the test center’s capacity that would slow the test process: a limited number 
of survivability ranges and anthropomorphic test devices (test dummies).  COL Rooney 
needed a $12 million investment in the survivability ranges, which he secured by 
leveraging the importance of the MRAP program.  This allowed him to triple the center’s 
test capacity between December 2006 and March 2007.  In addition, he built, over time, 
the quantity of anthropomorphic test devices from eight at the program start to 45, at the 
time of this report.  These facility and equipment upgrades were key to the program 
success because of the time intensive nature of the set-up and the data collection involved 
in survivability testing. 
In conjunction with the MRAP JPO, COL Rooney’s team developed an 
aggressive test program that fed directly into source selection.  In effect, the program 
office established threshold specifications based primarily on survivability.  As soon as 
manufacturers delivered test vehicles to Aberdeen, those vehicles were tested as per this 
plan.  Manufacturers meeting initial thresholds for survivability as well as basic 
automotive characteristics were given production contracts.  Although all vehicles 
meeting those standards were ultimately purchased, the process started as a competition 
of sorts, with the first vehicle or vehicles successfully passing the testing program and 
possibly receiving all of the initial orders.  This screening process, heavily focused on 
survivability but much less on reliability and maintainability, introduced significant risk 
to the program, but it also added two notable benefits.  First, the promise of multiple 
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awards incentivized multiple manufacturers to participate in the process.  Second, the 
promise of award to the first successful vehicle or vehicles, with additional incentives for 
delivery ahead of schedule, led manufacturers to deliver test vehicles quickly and to 
modify designs based on test feedback.  The program manager accepted risk with the 
T&E plan but, in doing so, added speed to the procurement process.  In addition, 
competition among manufacturers improved the quality of products available to the 
program in later contracts. 
B. T&E EXECUTION 
 The developmental test program was designed and conducted in three phases.  
Developmental Test C1 (DT-C1) consisted of threshold testing with an approximate ratio 
of 90% focus on survivability and 10% on automotive (Hansen, 2008, May 30).  It also 
included a limited user test, in which a platoon of Soldiers and a platoon of Marines with 
operational experience conducted operational tests on the vehicles.  Results of both the 
threshold and the user testing were immediately fed to manufacturers for potential 
changes that were quickly retested.  To be considered a suitable MRAP, each vehicle had 
to complete DT-C1 with a green (no deficiencies) rating on survivability and green or 
amber (some minor deficiencies) in automotive and user tests.  Of the seven 
manufacturers that submitted vehicles for testing during MRAP I, five had a vehicle in at 
least one class16 that met the required thresholds of DT-C1 and were determined suitable 
during user tests; all five manufacturers were subsequently awarded production contracts.  
A listing of DT-C1 activities is shown in Figure 11. 
                                                 
16 Some manufacturers submitted vehicles for more than one category.  IMG, for example, submitted 
Category 1 and 2 versions of the MaxxPro.  Although the Category II version was rated green in 




Figure 11.   DT-C1 Test Overview  
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 35) 
 
One notable risk taken during DT-C1 involved the GFE, such as communications 
gear and IED jammers.  At this early stage of the program, the GFE package for each 
Service and vehicle configuration was undetermined.  Consequently, the vehicles were 
not tested in their exact operational set-up.  To mitigate, the test team used surrogate 
weight for likely GFE equipment.  Additionally, the test team worked closely with the 
integration team at SPAWAR in Charleston, SC, to retest as necessary once the GFE 
packages were determined for each vehicle. 
Developmental Test C2 (DT-C2), shown in Figure 12, consisted of more in-depth 




Figure 12.   DT-C2 Test Overview  
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 36) 
 
Developmental Test C3 (DT-C3), shown in Figure 13, added yet another level of 
automotive and survivability testing and added non-ballistic survivability testing as well.  
Survivability testing includes extensive use of anthropomorphic test devices, which 
makes set-up and data collection both time and resource intensive, but it also provides an 
in-depth characterization of the vehicle and the protection it provides to every passenger 
in a vehicle.   
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Figure 13.   DT-C3 Test Overview 
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 37) 
 
Whereas DT-C1 focused on threshold testing for minimum acceptable 
performance, DT-C2 and DT-C3 focused more on objective requirements and, in some 
cases, testing to failure.  This full test strategy, shown in Figure 14, allowed the PM to 
quickly determine which vehicles met minimum requirements and send them into 
production.  After that, the DT-C2 and C3 tests were designed and used to provide full 
characterization of the vehicle for potential design changes, future procurement decisions, 
and for the long-term benefit of the vehicle’s program office and users.  This test strategy 
represents a hybrid approach in that it combines developmental, operational, and live fire 
testing, rather than conducting them as separate phases of the test and evaluation 
program.  Also notable is that given the urgent need and rapid fielding of these vehicles 
as they came off production lines, the program still conducted an initial operational test 
and evaluation (IOT&E).  This month-long test, which provides required feedback for 
any FRP decision, was conducted in September 2007 at Yuma Proving Ground.  At this 
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point in the program, however, several thousand vehicles were already under contract 
with manufacturers ramping toward full capacity.  This example demonstrates the unique 
nature of the MRAP program in that the T&E plan was fully executed (and continues to 
be), with a level of detail on par with any other major program.  The difference and 
associated trade-off in this case, however, is that most of the production and source 




Figure 14.   MRAP Test Overview  
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 11) 
 
C. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS 
Testing for the MRAP program is unique in many ways.  The unprecedented 
funding, political pressure from numerous sources, and emphasis by senior leaders in the 
DoD, including the Secretary of Defense, gave this program advantages that will be 
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difficult to replicate in any situation other than emergency measures targeted at saving 
lives.  These conditions allowed the rapid expansion of the test facilities needed to 
support the rapid testing.  They also set the conditions whereby numerous vehicles would 
be available for testing.  At the time of this report, 58 MRAP vehicles are present at the 
Aberdeen Test Center.  Although this is unrealistic for most test programs, it is an 
integral part of the program plan, which enables concurrent survivability and automotive 
testing.  Normally, prototype vehicles are limited such that all automotive testing must be 
done before proceeding with destructive survivability testing.   
From COL Rooney’s perspective, “No program has embraced testing more or 
better than MRAP” (2008, August 7).  He attributes this to the constant JPO focus on the 
goal of getting the maximum number of survivable vehicles to warfighters in the shortest 
time possible.  At least four factors were critical to the T&E effort for the MRAP 
program.  First, the early formation of the TIWG fostered cooperation and frequent 
communication between all parties involved in the T&E effort.  This structure enabled 
development of an effective and flexible TEMP and assisted the program in getting the 
resources needed in the effort.  Second, the use of multiple manufacturers with constant 
on-site presence during the T&E fostered competition and rapid feedback of T&E into 
design changes.  This enabled the JPO to determine the best materiel solution from across 
industry, and the on-site competition established an atmosphere of improvement among 
the manufacturers.  Third, the presence of multiple test vehicles for each variant enabled 
the JPO to determine the capabilities and limitations of each variant faster and more 
thoroughly.  Cases in which the test center has only one prototype require that destructive 
survivability testing be conducted after automotive testing, which slows the process.  
Multiple prototypes for the MRAP T&E allowed for a concurrent and continuous T&E 
effort.  Finally, whereas some program managers dispute or are unreceptive to negative 
test results, the MRAP PM was fully committed to the test program.  As a result, the JPO 
learned capabilities and limitations of each variant faster and more thoroughly.  Although 
these factors are arguably due to the unique nature of the requirement as addressed 
earlier, the researchers believe that these lessons should be applied to the maximum 
extent possible in future programs, whether rapid or standard in nature.   
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As with all decisions, trade-offs were a necessary part of the T&E plan for the 
MRAP program.  The first and most obvious trade-off in this case involved the heavy 
emphasis on survivability during DT-C1, at the expense of reliability, maintainability, 
and other supportability issues.  The PM accepted significant risk in that some of the 
vehicles fielded, although survivable, may have been difficult to sustain and may have 
had low operational availability.  A second trade-off involved the prioritization of the 
MRAP ahead of existing and ongoing acquisition programs.  As a result of the un-
forecasted MRAP T&E requirements, personnel and other resources were reallocated 
from some programs.  Consequently, some schedules were adjusted and programs had to 
replace reassigned personnel; however, no program missed an acquisition decision based 
on changes made at the Aberdeen Test Center due to MRAP T&E requirements.  In 
addition, the MRAP program provided a silver lining for existing and future programs 
with the facility and equipment upgrades it brought to Aberdeen.  
 62
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 63
V. PRODUCTION AND INTEGRATION 
The MRAP production and integration process is best examined in terms of the 
value stream from subcomponents through the final integration effort and transportation 
to warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This basic process, as shown in Figure 15, begins 
with the numerous suppliers to the five prime contractors manufacturing the vehicles.  
These suppliers produce the components and subassemblies such as engines, 
transmissions, axles, and seats.  Within this supply base exists some of the bottlenecks 
associated with MRAP production, such as armor and, initially, tires.  To demonstrate the 
complexity at this level, the JPO has identified 62 major Tier 2 vendors17 for 15 critical 
sub-assemblies (Hansen, 2008, June 4, slide 11).   
 
Figure 15.   MRAP Production Value Stream 
 
                                                 
17 Tier 2 and lower level vendors refer to the supply chain below the prime contractors. 
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Following Tier 2 and lower level suppliers, the value stream flows to the prime 
contractor level, in which the vehicles are assembled and receive the first DCMA 
acceptance inspection.  Upon inspection, vehicles from all five manufacturers are 
delivered to SPAWAR in Charleston, SC, for integration and installation of GFE.  At this 
site, DCMA conducts yet another acceptance inspection and works with the prime 
contractors to resolve any quality issues during the GFE integration and installation 
phase.  Given the multiple vehicle variants and ever-changing GFE requirements that 
vary by Service, the integration effort at SPAWAR was an initial area of concern and 
bottleneck in the production process.  Following integration, selected vehicles are fitted 
with MEAP (MRAP Expedient Armor Program)18 armor at multiple facilities in the 
Charleston area and are then moved to the Port of Charleston or Charleston Air Force 
Base for movement to the CENTCOM area of operations (AO). 
This next section of the report focuses on key processes within the value stream, 
starting with critical resource constraints at the supplier level and actions taken to 
mitigate these potential bottlenecks to production.  It also provides an overview of the 
actual production process, with vignettes from two of the largest MRAP manufacturers, a 
major Tier 2 supplier, and the integration effort at SPAWAR. The interaction and quality 
assurance provided by DCMA is critical throughout this process and is also examined. 
A. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS 
Some of the primary components and subassemblies supplied at the Tier 2 level 
include axles from three manufacturers, four different engines from three manufacturers, 
multiple transmissions from one manufacturer, and suspension components from nine 
manufacturers (Hansen, 2008, June 4, slide 11 and  MRAP JPO, 2008, June 2).  Of these 
items, as well as most other components, sufficient capacity existed within the defense 
and commercial industrial bases to meet the demands of the MRAP program.  When 
added to existing demands from commercial businesses as well as other programs within 
                                                 
18 MEAP is additional armor applied to the sides of MRAP vehicles as added protection against 
explosively formed penetrators (EFP) which became prevalent after the start of the MRAP program.  It is 
installed in the Charleston area vice at the OEM (original equipment manufacturer) site due to its weight 
and bulk. 
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the DoD, however, this spike in demand posed potential limits on production rates.  
These limits were in many cases unknown and dependent on how lower level suppliers 
would react to the increased demand for their products.  Some of the resource constraints 
were identified or clarified through industrial surveys conducted by the Office of the 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial Policy.  These surveys helped to define 
production limits in steel and in the heavy tires needed for the vehicles (Hansen, 2008, 
May 30).   
To mitigate these potential bottlenecks, three major actions were taken to 
prioritize and increase production of necessary components and materials for the MRAP 
program.  First, on May 2, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a 
memorandum stating the following: 
The MRAP program should be considered the highest priority Department 
of Defense acquisition program and any and all options to accelerate the 
production and fielding of this capability to the theater should be 
identified, assessed and applied where feasible.  In this regard, I would 
like to know what funding, materiel, program, legal or other limits 
currently constrains the program and the options available to overcome 
them.  This should include an examination of all applicable statutory 
authorities available to the Secretary of Defense or the President.  (Owen, 
2008, p. 14) 
Concurrent with this memo, Secretary Gates directed the establishment of a DoD 
MRAP Task Force whose objective was to “get as many of these vehicles to our Soldiers 
and Marines in the field as is possible in the next several months”  (Young et al., 2007, p. 
2).  Not only did this clearly establish the MRAP program as the top priority for all 
resources and effort within the DoD, the task force and its direct reporting line to the 
Secretary added an additional level of pressure to all program participants and 
stakeholders.  In effect, the memorandum directed all officials involved in the program to 
identify any issues that might constrain the program and take action to mitigate them.  
One such example occurred on May 22, 2007, when Dr. Delores Etter, the Navy 
Acquisition Executive, approved an exception to Title 10 U.S. Code section 2533b, 
which “prohibits DoD from procuring end items, or components thereof, containing 
 
 66
specialty metals not melted or produced in the United States” (Young et al., 2007, p. 7).  
Such exceptions were made and waivers requested in many cases based on this direct 
guidance from the Secretary of Defense. 
This top-level prioritization also provided emphasis and direction to industry, 
which had competing requirements in both government and commercial work.  The effect 
of this public prioritization must also be considered within the context of the situation on 
the ground in Iraq.  In May 2007, casualties were at their highest sustained rate of the war 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008).  The combination of these two factors 
effectively created a moral imperative for industry to support the program. 
The second action, which flowed directly from the prioritization, occurred on 
June 1, 2007, when Secretary Gates approved a DX rating under the Defense Priorities 
and Allocation System (DPAS) (Young et al., 2007, p. 5).  As outlined in Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 11.6, a DX rating is the highest priority rating and 
requires preferential acceptance and performance of contracts and orders supporting 
certain approved national defense programs (DoD, 2008).  This rare step prioritized the 
MRAP program by law within American industry, requiring all MRAP-related orders to 
be filled first and ahead of existing orders, with the exception of other DX rated orders.19  
The DX rating assisted FPII in eliminating a potential bottleneck in transfer case 
availability due to insufficient production capacity of a specific tapered roller bearing 
(Walsh, 2008a, August 6).  Although IMG had no significant sourcing issues, SFI 
Fabrication—a Tier 2 supplier—used the DX rating to buy welding equipment and a laser 
cutting machine within weeks when such acquisitions would typically take months (Carr, 
Collins, & Daniel, 2008, August 22).  These examples show that the DX rating is a very 
powerful tool for use in a rapid acquisition program.  Although it varies in importance by 
manufacturer, it is critical throughout the supply chain. 
                                                 
19 DPAS provides two levels of priority for rated orders, DO and DX.  DX rated orders take priority 
over all unrated and DO rated orders.  Multiple DX rated orders hold the same level of priority; therefore, 
multiple DX rated orders are handled on a first-in, first-out basis.  Based on the small number of DX rated 
programs, the MRAP program did not encounter any conflicts with other DX rated orders. 
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As John Young20, then-MRAP Task Force Chairman, pointed out on November 
8, 2007, “DX ratings provide the most important DoD programs priority access to scarce 
production resources; however, they do not resolve fundamental production capacity 
shortfalls” (Young et al., 2007, p. 5).  This reality led to the third major action—direct 
intervention by the DoD in the areas of industry where production capacity did not meet 
the need.  Specifically, this involved tires and steel.  In July 2007, industrial surveys 
indicated a production capacity of tires for MRAP class vehicles at less than 1,000 per 
month.  With a planned production rate of 1,196 vehicles per month, this was well short 
of the needed capacity (p. 6).  The DoD provided $4 million to the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) to purchase additional tire molds for the then-sole-source supplier, 
Michelin, to expand production (Castellaw, 2007, p. 5).  In addition, the DoD added 
Goodyear as a second source, increasing capacity to approximately 17,000 tires per 
month in January 2008 (Young et al., 2007, p. 6).  This addition provided the capacity to 
meet not only new vehicle production but also the requirement for operational spares and 
replacements. 
The second major capacity shortage—production of steel—also required 
considerable attention.  The total DoD demand for steel is only a fraction of the U.S. 
production capacity, but armor steel plate and thin gauge, quenched, and tempered steel 
required for MRAP vehicles are niche requirements within that industry.  These specialty 
steels require unique processes and equipment that are available in only a few places 
(Young et al., 2007, pp. 6-7).  To increase capacity, the JPO and MRAP Task Force 
advance procured two types of steel (P900 and High-Hard), qualified additional sources 
of steel to increase the defense industrial base, and made a specification change (qualified 
ASTM 4330/4130 & AL521 steel as alternatives to MIL-A-46100 High Hard steel) to 
increase material options (Steinholtz, 2007, Slides 6-7).  The program also used the 
waiver process as described above to qualify and buy from overseas sources.  These 
actions increased capacity from about 8,400 tons of the specialty steel per month at the 
program start to 20,900 tons per month by November 2007 (Young et al., 2007, pp. 7-8). 
                                                 
20 The Honorable John J. Young, Jr. is the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, current as of this writing. 
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The resource constraints and actions taken to mitigate them demonstrate the range 
of tools available within the DoD for a rapid acquisition.  By issuing clear guidance on 
priority, invoking the Defense Priorities and Allocation System, obtaining waivers to 
statutory requirements, and intervening where necessary in the supply chain, officials 
involved with the program virtually eliminated the bottlenecks in resources needed for 
desired production rates. 
B. MANUFACTURER VIGNETTES 
As previously discussed, nine manufacturers responded to the original request for 
proposal, with seven manufacturers’ vehicles tested, and five awarded production 
contracts.  These manufacturers ranged from traditional U.S. defense contractors such as 
BAE Systems (BAE), General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), and Armor Holdings 
(AH);21 to niche manufacturer Force Protection Industries, Inc. (FPII); and to a 
subsidiary of a large commercial manufacturer with no recent defense business, 
International Military and Government, LLC (IMG).  This section will provide an 
overview of two of those manufacturers, FPII and IMG, and their history in the program.  
It also provides insight at the lower levels of the supply chain with a vignette on an IMG 
supplier, SFI Fabrication. 
1. Force Protection Industries, Incorporated (FPII) 
Force Protection Industries, Incorporated (FPII) traces its roots to the civil wars of 
southern Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.  Prevalent in these conflicts was the use of land 
mines and other explosive devices, very similar in nature to the threats that U.S. and 
coalition forces initially faced in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In response to significant 
casualties from these attacks, the South African Government tasked its Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) with developing technologies to increase their 
soldiers’ survivability.  CSIR, formed in 1945, “undertakes directed and multidisciplinary 
research, technological innovation as well as industrial and scientific development to 
                                                 
21 Armor Holdings’ Caiman Vehicle is produced by its subsidiary Stewart and Stevenson, maker of the 
DoD’s Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles.  Armor Holdings is now owned by BAE Systems and operates 
as BAE-Tactical Vehicle Solutions (BAE-TVS). 
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improve the quality of life of the country’s people” (Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research, 2008).  Out of this research came the basic MRAP technology used today 
(Walsh, 2008a, August 6).  Namely, this includes a monocoque, raised, V-shaped, 
armored hull to deflect the force of a blast outward from the vehicle. 
A young chemist named Dr. Vernon Joynt was one of the lead scientists working 
on the counter-mine program for CSIR.  In the mid-1990s, Dr. Joynt, along with a 
Rhodesian Special Air Service officer, Garth Barrett, brought the MRAP technology to 
the United States with the goal of capitalizing on the then-prevalent humanitarian de-
mining operations being sponsored by the United Nations.  They developed a three-
vehicle concept for route clearance operations and in 1997 formed a company called 
Technical Solutions Group (TSG).  Within this concept, one vehicle provided security, a 
second vehicle searched for mines or IEDs using ground penetrating radar and other 
sensors, and the final vehicle (the Buffalo) interrogated potential threats using its robotic 
arm and claw (2008a, August 6).  In 2002, the company was purchased by Force 
Protection, Inc. and went public on the NASDAQ exchange. 
The U.S. Army first purchased an FPII (TSG at that time) vehicle in 2000, when 
Communication and Electronics Command (CECOM), in an effort to find a mine 
protected clearance vehicle, bought one Buffalo for testing under a Foreign Comparative 
Test Program.22  In 2001, the Army bought another Buffalo for testing and in 2002 
bought 10 more for contingency purposes.  Between then and 2006, the Army bought an 
additional 76 Buffalos and the Marine Corps began purchasing Buffalos and a smaller 
MRAP variant and forerunner to the Cougar vehicle, the JERRV (Inspector General, 
2007, pp. 5-6).  This gradual build-up of sales enabled FPII to grow from 150 employees 
and $10 million in revenue in 2004 to 750 employees and nearly $200 million in revenue 
in 2006 (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).  In addition, these early sales positioned FPII as the 
leader in the MRAP program that started in November 2006.  Not only did FPII have the 
only products that had been tested and used in Iraq, they also had an active production 
                                                 
22 This program leverages foreign technology to meet requirements, thereby avoiding redundant 
research and development and lowering procurement cost and time (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
n.d.). 
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base.  For these reasons, the MRAP JPO accepted risk early in the program, awarding a 
sole-source contract for FPII Cougar and Buffalo vehicles, prior to the start of 
developmental testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. 
FPII currently manufactures MRAP vehicles at its Ladson, SC, facility, operates a 
blast and ballistic testing facility at Edgefield, SC, and conducts research and 
development at a facility in Summerville, SC.  In addition, FPII acquired a separate 
production facility in Roxboro, SC, and entered into agreements with other manufacturers 
to expand capacity if necessary.  The company currently employs approximately 1,500 
personnel, down from a peak of over 2,000 at the end of 2007 (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).  
Unlike other MRAP producers, FPII business is dedicated almost exclusively to MRAP 
vehicles.  Consequently, the long-term sustainability of the current size and work force of 
FPII is uncertain given the expected short duration of the MRAP program. 
The primary products from FPII are the Buffalo (CAT III) and Cougar family of 
vehicles (in CAT I and II versions) as shown in Figures 16 and 17.  The company is also 
developing a smaller line of vehicles, called the Cheetah, which attempts to combine the 
survivability of the larger MRAPs with the size and mobility of the HMMWV.  The DoD 
tested the Cheetah as part of MRAP II but has not procured any of those vehicles for 
fielding.  The biggest FPII customer is the U.S. DoD with the bulk of vehicles going to 
the Marine Corps.  It has also sold vehicles through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program to Canada, the United Kingdom, Iraq, Italy, and France and is forming a 
partnership with a British company to streamline sales to the United Kingdom, 




Figure 16.   FPII Buffalo Vehicle (Category III) 
(From Force Protection Industries, Inc., 2008) 
 
 
Figure 17.   FPII Cougar Vehicles (CAT II and I, respectively) 
(From Force Protection Industries, Inc., 2008) 
 
The FPII manufacturing process is straightforward with most fabrication done 
within the company.  The Buffalo vehicle starts production as a chassis and cab from a 
major truck manufacturer such as Mack or Peterbilt.  FPII then disassembles that truck 
and uses the engine and other drive-train components to build the new vehicle.  Major 
processes include forming sheet armor into monocoque capsules that make up the cab 




various fabricated parts are then integrated with the automotive components during final 
assembly.  All Buffalo production, with the exception of capsule formation, is conducted 
at the Ladson facility (Walsh, 2008a, August 6). 
Cougar production is very similar except the process starts with direct OEM 
components such as Caterpillar engines and Allison transmissions rather than a chassis 
cab from a major truck manufacturer.  Cougar production is spread between multiple 
facilities and among the FPII operating partners such as GDLS in Lima, OH, and 
Anniston, AL, as well as Spartan Motors in Charlotte, MI (2008a, August 6).  A key 
characteristic of the FPII manufacturing process is the high percentage of fabrication 
work done in-house.  This explains the relatively large workforce and lower production 
capacity as compared to IMG.  The basic FPII production process is shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18.   Basic FPII Production Process  
(From Walsh, 2008b, Slide 10) 
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At the start of the MRAP program, supply managers at FPII identified no sourcing 
issues with the exception of a specific Timken tapered roller bearing required for transfer 
cases.  The DX rating assigned to the program alleviated this concern; the company also 
worked with its axle supplier, Marmon Herrington, to increase capacity to meet the 
increased demand.  Armor was not seen as a shortage item, although it was a long-lead 
item that took up to 120 days to procure, even with the DX rating (Walsh, 2008a, August 
6).   
The FPII management was willing to license vehicle designs for production by 
other defense contractors at the program start.  The company entered a licensing 
partnership with General Dynamics, resulting in Cougars being produced by that 
company, as well as with BAE.  FPII also partnered with Armor Holdings (now owned 
by BAE) and Textron, Inc. as a means of expanding production capacity.  The company 
accepted risk at the start of the MRAP program, investing $50 million in long-lead items 
such as armor and axles in anticipation of contract awards and capacity expansion 
(2008a, August 6).  The raw material investment turned out to be a low-risk decision and 
paid off for the company, but the production capacity expansion far exceeded the 
eventual contracts that the company received.  This over-expansion is evident in the rapid 
growth in work force, followed by an approximate 25% reduction in 2008 when FPII did 
not receive the anticipated vehicle orders. 
The FPII strategy was to create a network of capacity across multiple OEMs, 
capitalize on the existing fleet of Cougars and the company’s history to secure the bulk of 
the MRAP market, get ahead and stay ahead of schedule, conduct strategic supply base 
purchases (at risk), and create a joint venture with a reputable defense contractor.  
However, the company has faced challenges based largely on the difficulties in rapidly 
transitioning from a small to a large business.  Namely, their technical data packages 
were immature, unstable, and unable to quickly incorporate changes needed for large-
scale production and licensing across multiple facilities and manufacturers.  In addition, 
this growth brought tremendous challenges due to the lack of an enterprise resource 
planning system that integrated accounting, ordering, estimating, and other functions 
(2008a, August 6).  Finally, the intensive in-house production process made ramp-up and 
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expansion contingent on rapidly expanding the work force.  That work force, 
consequently, may need to be further scaled down without substantial new business. 
2. International Military and Government, LLC (IMG) 
IMG, recently renamed Navistar Defense, is a subsidiary of Navistar International 
Corporation, the largest North American manufacturer of medium trucks, school buses, 
and diesel engines.  Headquartered in Warrenville, IL, Navistar operates major 
engineering and manufacturing facilities throughout the US, Canada, and Mexico.  Prior 
to the MRAP program, Navistar performed no major military work since the World War 
II era, when the company was known as International Harvester.  In 2004, Navistar’s 
CEO, Daniel Ustian, tasked another long-time Navistar employee and executive, Archie 
Massicotte, with establishing the IMG subsidiary as a means of expanding the company 
business into the military and government arena (Major, 2008, August 22).  Since that 
time, IMG has established itself as a responsive and high-quality manufacturer, securing 
roughly 40% of all orders under the MRAP program, to include 100% of the final vehicle 
order for lighter, smaller MRAP vehicles to be used in Afghanistan (Defense Industry 
Daily, 2008). 
The first major order for IMG actually came from Kellogg, Brown & Root 
(KBR), a major services contractor to the DoD, for an armored road tractor to be used in 
Iraq.  In this effort, IMG teamed with Griffin Incorporated, the leading American 
manufacturer of armored vehicles for the non-defense market, producing 558 road 
tractors outfitted with 360 degree fully armored cabs.  IMG built and delivered these 
vehicles, which they call KBR cabs, in five and a half months, demonstrating the ability 
to quickly ramp-up manufacturing capacity.  This effort started effectively from scratch, 
with Griffin Armor acquiring and rehabilitating an old facility in West Point, MS, for the 
project.  This same facility is being used for final assembly of the IMG MRAP vehicle, 
the MaxxPro, along with other vehicles produced within the IMG subsidiary.  Griffin 
Armor continues to operate the manufacturing facility as an operating partner to IMG 
(Munro, 2008, August 22).  
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Following production of the KBR cab, which ended in June 2006, IMG solicited 
other orders, and Griffin Armor used the West Point facility to produce a batch of 
armored personnel carriers for the Israeli Defense Ministry.  During this time, IMG 
developed a relationship with the Israeli company Plasan Sasa, which specializes in 
developing and manufacturing vehicle armor kits (Munro, 2008, August 22). 
When MARCORSYSCOM released the original MRAP solicitation in November 
2006, IMG initially developed a proposal in collaboration with a South African company.  
Approximately 72 hours before the proposal was due, however, a team from Plasan met 
with the IMG president, and convinced him to change the plan.  Over the next three days, 
the IMG team rewrote the proposal to incorporate the Plasan-designed armor package, 
completing and submitting the new proposal on the due date (Major, 2008, August 22).  
At that stage, the IMG proposal for the MaxxPro represented a truck in concept only, 
with no existing prototype and detailed design and integration work yet to be done.  
Because of this and the lack of recent and relevant past performance information, the JPO 
considered IMG a high-risk manufacturer.  Consequently, IMG was initially awarded 
only an IDIQ contract for four test vehicles.  This is in contrast to other companies 
considered low-risk that were awarded IDIQ contracts and production orders prior to 
testing under LRIPs 1 and 2. 
Following the initial contract award on January 26, 2007, IMG completed the 
detailed design, built prototypes, and delivered the first to the Aberdeen Test Center on 
March 10, 2007, beating all other manufacturers with the exception of FPII, which 
already had an operational assembly line (Aberdeen Test Center, 2008, August 11, slide 
2).  During the initial survivability testing of DT-C1, the MaxxPro performed poorly and 
was nearly eliminated from the competition.  However, IMG and Plasan worked closely 
with the test officials, analyzed the test results and redesigned and modified the vehicle, 
delivering new prototypes for testing in fewer than two weeks.  As the IMG MaxxPro 
program manager, John Major summarizes, “That was 10 days that really solidified the 
program” (2008, August 22).  That version of the MaxxPro passed the threshold 
requirements of DT-C1 and led to the first large IMG contract for 1200 vehicles on May 
24, 2007 (Owen, 2008, p. 23). 
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Unlike the monocoque capsule characteristic of MRAPs produced by FPII and the 
other manufacturers, the IMG MaxxPro consists of a modular design with a capsule that 
is bolted together in a series of steps.  The design leverages other Navistar subsidiaries, 
using a severe service chassis23 produced in Garland, TX.  The vehicle is designed for 
multiple strikes, with the survivability capsule easily moved from a destroyed chassis to a 
new one.  The CAT I version of the MaxxPro is shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19.   IMG MaxxPro (CAT I)  
(From Aberdeen Test Center, 2008, August 11, slide 2) 
 
The modular design of the MaxxPro also contributes to manufacturability.  In 
addition to the severe service chassis, the armor consists of three kits.  The A-kit consists 
of the driver platform, firewall, windscreen, and door frames.  The C-kit is the engine 
armory package.  Both kits are incorporated into the pre-existing chassis assembly line in 
Garland, TX, allowing the MaxxPro chassis to leave the plant as a drivable chassis, 
which reduces rework at the final assembly plant in West Point.  The B-kit, which forms 
the survivability capsule is then added at West Point and effectively completes the 
vehicle.  With the current set-up, IMG can produce up to 500 MaxxPro vehicles per 
month (Munro, 2008, August 22). 
                                                 
23 The chassis produced in Garland, TX, is in this case a heavy-duty drivable vehicle chassis complete 
with frame, drive-train, driver’s platform, and instrument panel. 
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Unlike the FPII design and assembly process, which places the time- and labor-
intensive manufacturing steps on the final assembly line, IMG traded complexity at the 
supply base for speed in final assembly.  This reliance on its supplier base exposes IMG 
to additional risk, given the tight production timelines of the MRAP program, but it is 
also characteristic of a world-class manufacturer in the automotive industry.  This 
reliance also allowed the company to expand capacity rapidly.  As an example, at peak 
production of 500 vehicles per month, the West Point facility employed 920 personnel, 
compared to more than 2,000 personnel at FPII for a lower production capacity.  The 
IMG vehicle design, pre-existing operations, and partnering relationships enabled the 
company to take the MaxxPro from concept to fielding in larger numbers and 
significantly faster than any of its competitors. 
In competing for the MRAP program, IMG took substantial risk as a corporation.  
As already stated, the JPO considered the company high-risk based on the lack of a 
working prototype and recent and relevant past performance information.  As a result, 
IMG invested in excess of an estimated $20 million to support capacity expansion for 
engines, chassis, armor, and other raw materials before receiving the first production 
contract (Major, 2008, August 22).  It also initially relied on a precarious supplier 
arrangement, with Plasan providing the armor by air from Israel.  This risk acceptance 
paid off for IMG, however; out of a total of more than 15,000 vehicles procured under the 
MRAP program, more than 6,000 will be manufactured by IMG.  
3. SFI Fabrication24 
One of the major IMG armor fabricators is SFI Fabrication, a small company with 
plants in Memphis, TN; Conway, AR; and New Boston, OH.  Prior to the MRAP 
program, SFI had an existing relationship with International School Bus, another 
subsidiary within Navistar.  In the original IMG sourcing arrangement, Plasan Sasa 
supplied the fabricated armor for the MaxxPro vehicles, and through the International 
School Bus/SFI relationship developed SFI as a fabricator in their supply chain (2008, 
                                                 
24 The information in this section was derived from a plant visit and group interview with company 
managers (Carr, Collins, & Daniel, 2008, August 22). 
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August 22).  When Plasan Sasa proved unable to meet the supply requirements, IMG then 
developed its own domestic supply chain for armor and fabrication, retaining SFI as a 
major subcontractor.  Although SFI currently conducts a large part of the fabrication for 
IMG, the armor plate sourcing is handled entirely by IMG.   
SFI did military work in the past, but the MRAP program was the first involving 
armor, which requires different procedures for welding and other fabrication.  It also 
represents the first experience working under a DX rating.  The large amount of work 
required an increase in work force, which was the biggest challenge.  To fill new 
positions, SFI held numerous job fairs and started an in-house welding school to improve 
the skills of its welders.  Concerning the DX rating, the company had to shift work 
between the three company facilities as well as outsource some work in order to establish 
the most efficient production mix.  In some cases, pre-existing orders were delayed by the 
MRAP program, but other SFI customers were patient given the circumstances (Carr, 
Collins, & Daniel, 2008, August 22). 
An initial area of concern for SFI as work began on the MRAP program involved 
CARC paint, which is required for all military vehicles.  Chemical Agent Resistant 
Coating (CARC) is not widely used within industry, few companies are certified in its 
application, and capacity is typically small for those that are.  As of August 2008, SFI 
was sub-contracting work to four different CARC painters (2008, August 22).  In 
addition, the use of multiple, geographically dispersed subcontractors introduced 
inefficiency in the supply chain, as fabricated components are shipped from the SFI 
facility in Memphis to places such as Fort Wayne, IN, and Huntsville, AL, for CARC 
paint, while the West Point MaxxPro plant is only 150 miles south of the SFI Memphis 
facility.   
This look at SFI provides key insight at the lower levels of the supply chain.  
First, the industrial base can and does quickly respond to urgent, lifesaving DoD 
requirements.  Obviously, financial incentive existed in this program for a company such 
as SFI, but managers also spoke of the moral imperative they felt to support this program.  
A second observation is that the SFI CARC paint issues demonstrate the detail in which 
the supply chain must be examined when attempting a rapid acquisition.  SFI is one of 
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several suppliers to multiple manufacturers, all competing for essentially the same 
resources.  This requires consideration of seemingly obscure items such as paint, in 
addition to the obvious issues such as tires and steel. 
C. INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE)25 
At the MRAP program outset, one of the initial areas of concern involved the 
integration of GFE.  This effort involves the installation of an average of 10 additional 
systems per vehicle.  These systems range from internal components such as radio 
mounts, intercom systems, and driver night sights, to external systems such as IED 
frequency jammers, spotlights, and antennae.  To add to the complexity involved with 
adding these systems to multiple variants of vehicles from five manufacturers, each 
Service and SOCOM required unique packages of GFE.  In addition, the GFE 
requirements have never stabilized, making the integration effort a process of continuous 
change and refinement.  Figure 20, the current vehicle mix by Service, and Figure 21, the 
GFE packages by Service, clearly demonstrate the number of unique variations and 
complexity involved in this process.  They also show the criticality of integration within 
the overall value stream. 
 
 
                                                 
25 The majority of the information in this section is drawn from an interview with Peter Ward (2008, 
August 5), Industrial Engineer at SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston. 
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Figure 20.   MRAP Variant Mix by Service  
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 14) 
 
 
Figure 21.   Government Furnished Equipment by Service  
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 13) 
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The decision to use the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR) in 
Charleston, SC, was made at the MRAP program outset based on the previous integration 
effort with up-armored HMMWVs for the Marine Corps.  Through work on HMMWVs, 
SPAWAR developed facilities, processes, and expertise in rapidly integrating multiple 
vehicles, thereby offering a unique capability at exactly the time it was needed.  As a 
Navy asset, SPAWAR involvement as a major contributor to a ground combat system 
program seems unconventional.  However, this effort is very much in line with the 
SPAWAR core mission, which revolves around engineering and command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
capabilities.  As Peter Ward, Industrial Engineer at SPAWAR points out, the organization 
focuses on those capabilities and how they can be applied on any platform (2008, August 
5).  In that respect, the SPAWAR core mission encompasses the types of systems 
included in MRAP integration.  Additionally, SPAWAR involvement reflects the recent 
focus on “joint-ness” in warfighting and in acquisitions.  As embodied in the JCIDS 
process, the MRAP program brings the best capabilities from across the DoD. 
In addition to the prior integration work and engineering capability, SPAWAR 
offered a number of other advantages that made it the logical choice for the effort.  First, 
the SPAWAR location in Charleston positions it near a railhead, a major Air Force Base 
with a C-17, wing and a secure seaport, all of which add efficiency in the value stream.  
Charleston Naval Weapons Station is also home to the Army 841st Transportation 
Battalion, which would oversee the transportation from the continental U.S. into the 
CENTCOM AO no matter where the integration occurred.  Second, SPAWAR provided 
precisely the testing capability needed for rapid integration prototyping with its Poseidon 
Park facility.  This facility is one of only a few in the U.S. that enables three critical tests 
needed for this effort26, reducing timeframes to 30 or fewer days—a process that can 
sometimes take years (Ward, 2008, August 5). 
                                                 
26 The Poseidon Park facility is used for: (1) co-sight interference testing to determine interference 
between GFE components, (2) hazard-to-personnel testing to determine whether GFE combinations created 
unacceptable levels of radiation for users, and (3) antenna pattern testing.  All are necessary to determine 
safe and effective combinations and positioning of GFE on the vehicles. 
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The integration process at SPAWAR consists of two steps: prototyping and full 
rate integration.  The prototype process is an engineering design process that involves a 
team of engineers who take each variant and determine the optimal fit for the required 
equipment.  On average, this process takes the team 30 days and includes testing as 
described above for each prototype.  The engineers, all government employees, take the 
approved design and create installation manuals.  These installation manuals are then 
passed to the SPAWAR lead contractor, which oversees GFE installation in the full-rate 
integration process.  Government quality assurance representatives (QARs) work with the 
contracted employees to ensure the installations are being done in accordance with the 
instruction manual intent and that every installation is tested to ensure it functions as 
designed.  The location of prototype engineers, integrators, and QARs under one roof, 
with test facilities close by, were key in the rapid prototyping and continuous changes 
needed for the program (Ward, 2008, August 5). 
With the large number of MRAP variants, ever-changing GFE combinations, and 
incorporation of feedback from warfighters, the full-rate integration process is constantly 
evolving.  Because of this, the 25 production lines at SPAWAR were not able to simply 
replicate tasks in assembly line fashion.  At one point, each line had an average turnover 
of four variants per week.  The organization has since found ways to control that 
variation, and the integration process now falls somewhere between a job shop and 
assembly line operation.  Each installation crew is now cross-trained on three to four 
variations, enabling better control of manufacturing tasks.  SPAWAR also implemented a 
Lean Six Sigma program to track key production metrics and implement continuous 
process improvements. 
As previously explained, the scale of the integration effort and the unknown 
production capacity at SPAWAR was a major area of concern at the start of the MRAP 
program.  With the process improvements discussed, as well as with continuous 
partnering efforts with vehicle and GFE manufacturers to shift labor intensive tasks such 
as bracket installation, welding, and painting farther up the value stream, SPAWAR built 
capacity to match or exceed the flow of vehicles from manufacturers.  Although 
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integration time varies by vehicle, as of this writing the SPAWAR average of about 10 
days per-vehicle far exceeds the original goal of 30 days per-vehicle (Ward, 2008, 
August 5).   
Success in the integration effort can be attributed to four key factors.  First, the 
focus on partnering between all members of the value stream enabled SPAWAR to work 
with vehicle and GFE manufacturers in implementing changes throughout the production 
process in order to speed the integration effort.  Second, the top-down focus on parallel 
and concurrent processes fostered continuous installation, regardless of test status during 
the integration process.  Although this focus added expense and the possibility of rework, 
it also increased the importance of rapid defect correction to prevent large amounts of 
rework.  The drawback was that some defects may have been discovered further along in 
production than would have been the case in a more deliberate process.  Third, the JPO 
focus on the overall program strategy and objectives (as many survivable vehicles as 
quickly as possible) permeated every part of the value stream to include the integration 
effort.  This translated into increased cooperation between all participants in the process, 
as well as a higher level of dedication and commitment from the integration team, which 
conducted continuous operations on a seven-day-per-week schedule with major emphasis 
on improving throughput.  Finally, the SPAWAR location and capability made it the 
ideal location for the effort. 
D. DCMA INVOLVEMENT27 
A critical participant in the MRAP program, from its start through final vehicle 
delivery to warfighters, has been the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  
Capt. Joseph Manna, Commander of DCMA Atlanta, summarized the MRAP effort by 
stating:  “If we would have followed normal bureaucratic procedures, we would have 
failed the mission” (2008, August 5).  The first DCMA work on the program included 
assistance to the JPO in completing industrial and pre-award surveys.  These core 
functions enabled the JPO to determine, at the outset, the industrial capacity for vehicle 
                                                 
27 This section draws largely from an interview with Capt. Joe Manna, Commander of DCMA Atlanta 
(Manna, 2008a, August 5). 
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production, as well as the responsibility of each manufacturer.  Following contract award, 
DCMA focus shifted to contract administration and quality assurance, with oversight on 
the value stream from the lowest tier suppliers to movement into the CENTCOM AO.   
Given the MRAP program status as the highest DoD acquisition priority, DCMA 
developed a strategy to reflect this.  The strategy included the following efforts:  
• work closely with the JPO and OEMs to preclude or fix acceptance issues 
early in the production process;  
• execute thorough process proofing for new production and integration lines; 
• influence prime and sub-contractors to smooth delivery schedules;  
• survey critical supplier inventories and deliveries daily; team with the JPO to 
validate new vendors;  
• issue letters of delegation to target DCMA support at key facilities;  
• provide feedback from SPAWAR to OEMs on identified deficiencies; and, 
• participate in integration cut-in efforts at OEM. (Manna, 2008, September 8, 
Slide 15).   
All efforts were made with a focus on speeding delivery of vehicles to 
warfighters, while providing quality assurance and enabling flexibility in the ever-
changing process.  Key in these efforts were the close interactions between DCMA and 
all stakeholders involved in production.  To facilitate these efforts, Capt. Manna focused 
on teaming arrangements between DCMA staff, manufacturers, and the integration team 
at SPAWAR.  This team relationship differed from the sometimes adversarial 
relationship between DCMA and contractors (Manna, 2008, August 5).   
A vital characteristic of the MRAP program is the emphasis on concurrency.  This 
involves keeping vehicles moving down the line - taking corrective action and/or 
implementing ECPs as the vehicles continue moving toward the ultimate transportation 
point.  For the MRAP program, this meant conditional acceptance of vehicles at the two 
primary DCMA inspection and acceptance points:  following production at the 
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manufacturer facilities and upon arrival for integration at SPAWAR.  This conditional 
acceptance applied only to minor deficiencies and non-critical parts shortages and came 
with a mutually agreed-upon plan for correction, a suspense date, and any necessary 
contract remedies.28  Compared to standard acquisition programs of a non-rapid nature, 
this conditional acceptance is unique; DCMA would normally require correction of all 
deficiencies prior to acceptance.  In addition, conditional acceptance inherently adds risk 
due to the addition of tracking requirements and the chance that deficiencies can be 
passed to the user.  In the case of the MRAP, however, the need was of such importance 
that continuous flow of the vehicles toward warfighters was the primary concern 
(Gregory, 2008, August 5).  The MRAP JPO therefore implemented a process to make 
this continuous flow of vehicles possible, allowing small deficiencies to pass through 
with the understanding that the manufacturers would correct those deficiencies before 
final delivery to users.  This should not be considered a best practice for most programs, 
however, because even small deficiencies can cause the user to lose confidence in a 
product, and conditional acceptance will inevitably result in some of these deficiencies 
reaching the user. 
A notable feature of the DCMA quality assurance program for the MRAP vehicle 
is that it attempted to identify all defects prior to shipment overseas, rather than waiting 
for the Product Quality Deficiency Report (PQDR) process that would eventually identify 
defects in the field.  Any quality issues are captured in written form as part of the PQDR 
Process, an investigation is performed to determine the root cause of the issue, the results 
are screened for validity, and the PM then takes any necessary action to resolve the 
problem (Marine Corps Logistics Command, 2008).  In the MRAP program, however, 
DCMA personnel inspect every vehicle, finding issues that would normally be addressed 
in the PQDR process and fixing them through teaming arrangements with manufacturer 
FSRs.  DCMA typically tries to do this in all production efforts; the difference for the 
                                                 
28 The PM detailed the conditional acceptance policy in a program policy letter.  This policy limited 
conditional acceptance to minor deficiencies or non-critical parts shortages.  Any deficiencies related to 
safety, survivability, drivability, or HVAC system operation were generally not authorized for conditional 
acceptance; authority for conditional acceptance in these cases was held at the PM level.  Such vehicles 
were considered shipped in place, with deficiencies corrected before shipment from the manufacturer 
facility (Mann, 2007). 
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MRAP program is that its production cycle will end before the PQDR process can 
provide useful feedback.  In this way, DCMA provides the only timely quality assurance 
feedback for the MRAP program.  
Another notable trade-off made in order to maximize industry participation in the 
program and speed production was the initial acceptance of immature quality systems 
among the manufacturers.  The MRAP contracts contained essentially the same quality 
system requirements as any program to include compliance with ISO 9001 standards or 
an equivalent system.  The difference for the MRAP program was recognition that rapid 
capacity expansion for some of the manufacturers would result in quality issues that 
would not be addressed as fast as the desired production rate.  This held true for 
manufacturers with immature processes and quality systems such as FPII.  This decision 
led to the full inspection of every vehicle, rather than spot inspection and lot acceptance.  
In the case of FPII, it also allowed a small manufacturer to participate in a program where 
the quality system requirement may normally have prevented it.  Although this increased 
risk in the process, the DCMA involvement mitigated this risk throughout the value 
stream, ensuring quality through end item inspection and on-site quality control 
monitoring (D. Hansen, personal communication, November 6, 2008). 
This brief overview covers only a portion of the DCMA effort involved in the 
program, but it shows the level of involvement by an agency already stretched thin on 
personnel.  Given the MRAP program priority, DCMA shifted personnel from other 
oversight projects such as at FN Manufacturing, where M-240 machine guns, M-249 
squad automatic weapons, and M-16 rifles are produced (Manna, 2008, August 5).  This 
again points to the trend of risk acceptance throughout the MRAP program.  In this case, 
not only were personnel removed from oversight positions supporting other programs, 
these personnel were re-assigned to oversee work outside their areas of expertise. 
E. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS 
This in-depth look at the production value stream provides insight to the factors 
that made the MRAP program successful from a production and integration perspective.  
The program priority, as communicated by the Secretary of Defense and executed by the 
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JPO, is evident throughout the process.  Accordingly, a number of key factors contributed 
to success in meeting the overall program objectives of fielding as many survivable 
vehicles as fast as possible.  First, the use of multiple vehicle manufacturers was a critical 
trade-off that allowed maximum expansion and use of the industrial base.  This allowed 
the program to leverage the strengths of each participating manufacturer and pre-
established supply chains.  Attempts to focus on a common design would likely have 
resulted in increased competition for limited resources and a corresponding reduction in 
capacity.  In addition, this decision brought in manufacturers that may have been less 
likely to commit resources given an all-or-nothing outcome.  Finally, the competition 
brought about by multiple manufacturers allowed the Government to determine the best 
vehicles and shift production in that direction later in the program. 
A second key factor in the production and integration effort involved the detailed 
DoD look at the entire supply chain, which allowed identification of key resource 
constraints such as tires and steel, and allowed for the implementation of efforts to 
mitigate these constraints.  It also demonstrates the range of tools available to assist a 
rapid defense acquisition, such as a DX rating under the Defense Priorities and Allocation 
System.  This powerful tool gives the Government priority status for materials needed for 
the program as well as resources needed to manufacture the product. 
A third factor evident in this effort, as well as the entire MRAP program, is the 
focus on concurrent processes.  As discussed under T&E, this factor introduces risk into 
the program as it increases the chance of rework or of fielding a vehicle difficult to 
sustain.  The benefit, however, is that concurrency again contributes to the overall 
program strategy and speeds the capability to warfighters. 
A fourth factor evident throughout the production and integration phases is the 
focus on partnering.  These efforts, fostered by the JPO and DCMA, teamed MRAP 
manufacturers with test officials, DCMA representatives, and system integrators at 
SPAWAR.  This teaming effort led to increased communications throughout the value 
stream and resulted in continual product and process improvement. 
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Finally, the use of SPAWAR as the systems integration facility proved one of the 
key program factors.  By leveraging the SPAWAR capability and location, the program 
turned a potential bottleneck into one of the greatest successes.  
As discussed throughout, key decisions that enabled success based on program 
strategy carried trade-offs that must be considered.  Throughout all phases of the 
program, one in particular is pervasive.  That trend, a trade-off of logistical sustainability 
in favor of maximized production, is the focus of the next section of this project. 
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VI. PROGRAM LOGISTICS 
A. MANPOWER & PERSONNEL 
Prior to the MRAP program establishment in December 2006, only three 
personnel within MARCORSYSCOM were assigned to oversee the limited amount of 
MRAP vehicles that had been previously procured.  These three were the program 
manager, the contracting officer, and an administrative assistant.  Following the 
designation of the MRAP requests as a JUONS, an Integrated Product Team (IPT) was 
formed to draft a RFP to solicit manufacturers who could produce and deliver these 
vehicles rapidly.  As the program started to gain momentum, there was still little growth 
in personnel numbers up until July 2007.  Up until this point, there was a two pronged 
approach to program expansion.  The Army set up its own program office for the MRAP 
vehicle with eight to ten personnel from TACOM whose purpose was to focus on MRAP 
issues and participate on IPTs.  At the same time, the Marine Corps established a staff of 
25 personnel that included logisticians, contract specialists, and financial managers.  
Some of these personnel were also well experienced in program and project management.  
Additionally, about 60 contracted personnel provided support services.  In total, until July 
2007, less than 100 personnel worked on the MRAP program29 (D. Hansen, personal 
communication, October 15, 2008). 
During this time, nine different manufacturers received contracts for the 
production of MRAP vehicles, seven of which eventually delivered prototype vehicles for 
testing.  These manufacturers were IMG, FPII, BAE, AH, OTC, PVI, and GDLS.  The 
program office had one individual overseeing each of the three categories of these 
vehicles, as well as the manufacturers offering vehicles within that category.  For 
individuals directly involved with the program, this meant long working hours, working 
 
 
                                                 
29 This does not include the approximate 250 previously mentioned personnel on theT&E team at 
Aberdeen Proving Ground. 
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outside their expertise, and multi-tasking.  After reorganizing the program office in 
August 2007, the JPO assigned an Assistant Program Manager (APM) to oversee each 
manufacturer product. 
The JPO also managed to enlist the services of personnel from the Air Force and 
the Navy who are not assigned to the program but still contribute by sharing the workload 
and providing expertise.  As of this writing, the Army alone has over 200 personnel from 
TACOM and the Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center 
(TARDEC) who contribute to the MRAP program.  Although these Army personnel are 
task organized to the program, they are not assigned and remain separated not only by 
distance, but also by culture and lack of a formal program of record.  The organizational 
structure shown in Figure 22 displays the positions within the JPO as of this writing, and 
demonstrates the growth in the program in less than two years (D. Hansen, personal 






Figure 22.   MRAP JPO Personnel Overview  
(After MRAP JPO, 2008, September 15) 
 
Unlike the other Services, Marine Corps personnel involved with the program are 
all directly assigned to the JPO.  As of this writing, that number is 40 personnel, with 
augmentation by ten Navy and three Air Force personnel, as well as over 200 support 
contractors within the Quantico area.  This brings the total number of personnel within 
the JPO to just fewer than 580, approximately 200 of whom are task organized for MRAP 
support, but not assigned to the JPO.  This number also includes individuals that are 
assigned part time to the program from various agencies.  Although the separation by 
distance between the various organizations under the JPO implies a difficult organization 
to manage, this separation has not affected the timeliness of the program.  In retrospect, 
this program has managed to get more accomplished with fewer personnel and in a 
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shorter amount of time when compared to other joint programs.  For most of the program 
existence, the JPO functioned with less than 60 government employees and yet still 
managed to meet mission goals (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  Figure 23 depicts the structure 
of the MRAP JPO, current as of this writing. 
 
 
Figure 23.   MRAP JPO Organizational Structure  
(From MRAP JPO, 2008c) 
 
Besides accomplishing MRAP contracting, testing, production, and fielding very 
rapidly, the compactness of the initial JPO produced advantages in that by starting small, 
the program grew towards right-sizing its personnel as opposed to spread-loading 
requirements.  With the expansion in personnel, individuals who initially worked in 
excess of 100 hours per week were able to transition to a more reasonable work schedule 
of 60 hours per week or less.  Additionally, by growing the personnel numbers, the JPO 
allowed individuals who were specialized in certain fields to focus on their areas of 
expertise.  Prior to the expansion of personnel, individuals had to execute all ten elements 
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of logistics singlehandedly with the assistance of a few support personnel.  As of this 
writing, the individuals associated with the program are specialized in their particular 
fields and are capable of doing their jobs effectively because they only have to focus on 
their own work (Hansen, 2008, June 10).   
In summary, the expansion of the JPO reduced the need for over-tasking 
personnel.  This expansion also allowed specialization rather than the multi-tasking 
prevalent at the program inception.  Even considering these strides, the program 
continues to face a less than ideal organizational structure in that it is an ad hoc 
organization and is not a program of record within the DoD. 
B. TECHNICAL DATA 
Contractually, MRAP vehicles were treated as commercial items and were 
therefore procured under fixed-price contracts from the start.  Given this commercial item 
designation and the relatively small 1,185 vehicle requirement at the program start, the 
MRAP JPO did not initially purchase technical data from any of the vehicle 
manufacturers.  All vehicles were originally intended to be maintained by the 
manufacturers, with reliance on contractor logistics support (CLS).  Therefore, purchase 
of technical data was deemed unnecessary during the initial procurement period.  
However, when the required number of MRAP vehicles increased, the JPO changed the 
sustainment plan to transition from CLS to hybrid/organic maintenance.  This required 
some technical data for the provisioning of parts, specifically the engineering data for 
provisioning (EDFP) (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  EDFPs are the drawings for parts and 
components that will be provisioned to support repair parts requirements.  
With the EDFP from each manufacturer, the JPO was able to use the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) system to compare identical, or similar, components that were 
already listed by National Stock Numbers (NSN).  This enabled the JPO to determine if 
identical parts or suitable substitutes existed within the defense supply system; parts that 
didn’t exist in the DoD supply system required new NSNs and addition to the supply 
system.  In many cases, the EDFP was proprietary to prevent reverse engineering of 
components by competing manufacturers, but was used by the Government to find 
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suitable substitutes (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  An example of this is the Caterpillar C7 
engine which is used in two of the MRAP vehicle variants, as well as the Marine Corps 
LAV and the Army Stryker vehicles.  Most of the parts on this engine already existed in 
the supply system, making provisioning simple.  IMG, on the other hand, used its own 
proprietary engines that were not previously used within the DoD.  Provisioning in this 
case required significantly more time and effort, as new NSNs were assigned and 
cataloged within the supply system. 
As stated by Deputy PM, Dave Hansen, “Ninety-nine percent of all technical data 
is used for provisioning and making sure that we can support the parts in the system for a 
long period of time” (2008, June 10).  Therefore, even if a component is proprietary with 
no match in the supply system, the JPO can still load the component into the system, 
identifying it as being solely distributed by a particular manufacturer.  In addition, EDFP 
serves as a form of insurance that allows the Government to procure a needed part even if 
the original manufacturer goes out of business or stops producing that part.  Finally, 
EDFP assists the DLA in accepting or rejecting a product, thereby helping to ensure that 
the end users get suitable parts.  
Within the MRAP program, the manufacturers were required to participate in a 
production verification audit.  This audit held all manufacturers accountable for the 
technical data they provided and assisted the JPO in understanding vehicle configuration 
provided by each of the manufacturers.  The JPO insisted that manufacturers correct 
discrepancies when found, and with the assistance of DCMA quality assurance personnel, 
verified the product met the specifications of the technical data.  Correction of 
discrepancies in the technical data helps the Government to maintain an accurate EDFP 
database with which to support sustainment operations (D. Hansen, personal 
communication, 2008, October 15).       
The technical data for the MRAP program concerning maintenance is currently 
collected at the unit or organizational level.  Data indicating reliability, maintainability, 
and operational availability would normally be available as the result of testing and 
therefore influence acquisition programs, but the MRAP program rapid testing with 
emphasis on survivability prevented this data from being collected prior to vehicle 
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procurement.  Data such as mean time between failure (MTBF), mean time to failure 
(MTTF), mean down time (MDT), and mean time to repair (MTTR) were instead 
gathered after procurement.  This represents risk acceptance by the JPO in support of the 
program objectives, as well as a potential trade-off of reliability, maintainability, and 
availability in exchange for speed in fielding.  The absence of reliability and failure data 
from vehicle testing increased sustainment risk; that is, reliability and failure information 
contributes to accurate quantity estimation needed for repair parts provisioning.   
C. DESIGN INTERFACES  
Considering the multiple manufacturers and vehicle variants involved in the 
MRAP program, integration of equipment was a major challenge.  As previously 
discussed, each Service had unique GFE requirements and some Services had 
requirements unique to specific units or applications. 
The original solicitation provided the minimum essential interface controls 
identified at the program start for Mission Equipment Packages (MEP), considering that 
multiple manufacturers would be used.  These interfaces were identified based on the 
space, power, heat load, cabling, cableways, and all through-hull connections required.  
Figure 24 is an example of a list of Mission Equipment Package items identified by the 
JPO for integration into the CAT II Infantry Tactical Maneuver Vehicle.  Additional 
MEP packages were specified for the CAT II Ambulance vehicle, the CAT II Convoy 
vehicle, and the CAT I Reconnaissance vehicle.  By tasking the manufacturers to provide 
key interfaces necessary for the SPAWAR integration effort under a “plug and play” 
concept, the JPO achieved success in providing full functionality of the MRAP variants 
before they ever reached using units.  This relieved the crew or organization-level 
mechanics from the burden of configuring MRAPS for in-theater operations.  Continuous 
crew feedback has also led to modifications to improve the fit and functionality of the 






M2 50 Caliber Machine Gun MK 19 40 mm Grenade Machine Gun
M240 B 7.62mm Machine Gun TOW Improved Target Acquisition System 
Gunner Protection Kits 
Sensors and Countermeasures
Driver Viewer Enhancer
Counter Remote Electronic Warfare System 
(CREW)
White and IR Spotlight
Loudspeaker public address system
MISSION EQUIPMENT PACKAGE
Infantry Tactical Maneuver Vehicle (CAT II)
Weapons System
Vehicle Intercom System (VIS) Enhanced Position Location Reporting System 
(EPLRS)
Common Remotely Operated Weapons 
Station (CROWS)
Command, Control, Communication & Computers (C4)
Dual Radio ASIP SINCGARS FBCB2 - Blue Force Tracker
 
Figure 24.   MEP Items Identified for Integration by the JPO  
(After MRAP JPO, 2006). 
 
By identifying key integration requirements early in the program, the JPO enabled 
the manufacturers to modify designs without compromising personnel safety or structural 
integrity of the vehicles.  Again, however, a trade-off was made in that less than 100% of 
the required interfaces were identified at the program start.  This trade for time at the 
program start led to a more labor intensive and time-consuming installation effort at the 
SPAWAR integration site.  
D. COMPUTER RESOURCES  
Two computer applications played a critical role in the MRAP program.  They are 
Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF) and Windchill (WC).  Both of these Internet-based 
applications facilitated the simultaneous flow of information among multiple points, 
which was essential to the MRAP program success, given its widely dispersed operations.  
These applications allowed all parties involved to see a common operating picture with 
the most up-to-date information, despite their geographical separation.  Both of these 
Internet sharing applications allowed JPO and other personnel to conduct concurrent 
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activities based on real time information.  Every functional area within the MRAP JPO 
had a station set up for WAWF and/or WC access, providing all personnel with the latest 
information (D. Hansen, personal communication, 2008, October 15). 
WAWF is a paperless, DoD-wide contract administration system designed to 
eliminate paper from the receipt and acceptance process of the DoD contracting lifecycle.  
The goal is to give authorized defense contractors and DoD personnel the ability to create 
invoices, receive reports, and access contract related documents.  Traditional DoD 
business methods call for three documents to make a payment:  the contract, the receiving 
report, and the invoice.  However, this is only true if the paper method is being used.  
These three documents are processed separately, and information is then manually keyed 
into the payment system (Defense Finance and Accounting Service, n.d.).  The WAWF 
application eliminates the paper trail and redundant processes, and instantly shares all 
documents electronically.  It also increases the accuracy of the data while reducing the 
risk of losing documents.  WAWF was primarily used by the DCMA representatives who 
supported this program, the MRAP JPO staff, and the MRAP manufacturers. 
WAWF provides many benefits such as improved efficiency, data accuracy, and 
speed of payment.  For the MRAP program, however, the main benefit was in providing 
contractors and the DoD immediate accessibility to requisite documents from anywhere 
in the world.  This mitigated the risk of conditional vehicle acceptance, because it 
facilitated the deficiency tracking and resolution process.  As previously discussed, this 
conditional vehicle acceptance is an example of the concurrency of effort that contributed 
to the program success. 
The second important application, Windchill, is business collaboration software 
that is designed to enable development efficiencies while reducing errors and rework.  
This software assists in managing distributed product development, product content, 
business processes, and complex information assets (Parametric Technology Corporation, 
n.d.).  It is fast, secure, scalable and interoperable, which enabled the JPO to post and 
share documents, despite having manufacturers and departments dispersed across the US.  
This Internet-based method proved an efficient way for the JPO to share information 
when individuals were not operating at their local workstations.  It not only worked 
 98
within the continental U.S. (CONUS), but also for sharing information between the 
CONUS-based JPO and individuals deployed in the CENTCOM AO (D. Hansen, 
personal communication, 2008, October 15). 
WC benefited the JPO because it reduced rework and therefore saved time.  WC 
also enhanced the cross-enterprise understanding of program activity because it allowed 
everyone to see a common operating picture.  Finally, WC gave its users within the JPO 
the freedom of mobility.  Since information could be accessed almost anywhere, 
individuals were not restricted to working from their cubicles, but could execute their 




Figure 25.   Windchill Field Issues and Response  
(From Conway, 2008, Slide 26) 
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E. MAINTENANCE PLANNING 
A major factor in the high readiness rate of MRAP vehicles has been the use of 
contractor logistics support (CLS) during initial fielding.  In the summer of 2007, as 
MRAP vehicle requirements expanded dramatically, the JPO shifted to a hybrid/organic 
approach, with eventual plans for fully organic sustainment.  CLS, however, remained 
critical.  Prior to the transition to organic support at the unit level, the ratio of FSRs to 
vehicles was one to ten.  The JPO attained this ratio by pooling the efforts of original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and organizing cross-training among the FSRs from 
each manufacturer.  As an example of the commitment of one manufacturer to the 
program, FPII went from 105 FSRs to 300 in just a matter of months (Walsh, 2008a, 
August 6). 
The short ramp-up to MRAP fielding did not afford the program time to fully test 
the vehicles for maintainability, nor did the JPO initially develop a maintenance plan 
beyond CLS.  Given the commercial item designation, the JPO originally determined that 
manufacturers would maintain their own products; this created the need for FSRs.   
As of this writing, unit organic maintenance personnel perform 10-level (crew-
level) and some 20-level (organization-level) MRAP vehicle maintenance, while FSRs 
perform 20- and higher-level maintenance.  In most cases, FSRs supervise the 10-level 
maintenance and ensure it is being properly performed.  Additionally, to keep up with the 
latest technology, organic maintenance personnel do perform minor modification work 
orders within their capabilities.  This prevents the necessity of running combat patrols to 
the regional support activities (RSAs) for purely maintenance purposes.  For example, 
modifications such as 360 degree light kits and integration of other GFE have been 
completed by unit maintenance personnel in theater (Hansen, 2008, June 10). 
For the maintenance policy at the unit level including preventive maintenance 
procedures, FSRs and unit maintenance officers of each unit are responsible for updating 
and making recommended changes.  This is attributable to the limited endurance and 
reliability testing prior to vehicle procurement, which did not allow determination of 
MTBF, MTTR, or other data necessary in developing maintenance procedures.  The 
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strategy was simple: ensure that repair parts are on hand, and then drive the MRAP until 
it breaks.  Although these vehicles were commercially acquired, the standard unit 
mechanic’s toolset contained most of the tools needed to work on the MRAP. The only 
missing item, a fixture required for removal and installation of the MaxxPro belly-plate, 
has since been provided by IMG (D. Hansen, personal communication, 2008, November 
14).   
As of this writing, the JPO has achieved its goal of 90% operational readiness 
(OR) rate (MRAP JPO, 2008, October 21).  This success is directly attributable to the 
decision to use CLS early in the program.  This enabled the JPO to rapidly field the 
vehicles and maintain a high OR rate, while buying time for building the organic 
capability to sustain the MRAP fleet.  This provides yet another example of how 
concurrency of effort contributed to success in the MRAP program. 
F. TRAINING 
FSR and uniformed mechanic training courses are conducted at the Red River 
Army Depot (RRAD) in Texarkana, Texas.  Participants in this training come from 
across the Services and MRAP manufacturers.  This consolidated training was 
implemented by the JPO and was named MRAP University (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  
1. MRAP University 
MRAP University offers cross-platform training geared towards familiarizing all 
attendees with the five most common MRAP vehicles, as shown in Figure 26.  MRAP 
University was created to provide a common place to familiarize personnel on operations 
and maintenance of the multiple variants of MRAP vehicles.  It is run by TACOM and 
has been active since November 2007.  Until September 19, 2008, MRAP University 
offered two courses, the Field Level Maintenance Training Course and the Operator 
Training Course, both 40 hours in length.  These courses provided basic familiarization 
and operator training, as well as an overview of maintenance, diagnostics and 
troubleshooting, and recovery procedures.   
 101
The Operator Training Course was directed at unit level operators and covered 
basic familiarization, preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), day and night 
driver training, emergency and recovery procedures, and operator level troubleshooting 
and maintenance (MRAP University, n.d.).   
The Field Level Maintenance Training Course was focused on FSRs, instructors, 
TACOM LARs, and key military personnel such as Battalion Maintenance Officers 
(BMOs) and Battalion Maintenance Technicians (BMTs).  For each of the five vehicles, 
this course covered basic vehicle characteristics, safety, warnings and cautions, operation, 
maintenance procedures, diagnostics and troubleshooting procedures, and finally, an 
overview of the recovery procedures (MRAP University, n.d.).  
 
 
Figure 26.   The Vehicles of MRAP University  
(After Hansen, 2008, June 4, slide 10). 
 
The success of MRAP University resulted in a shift in focus after September 19, 
2008, from basic operator and maintenance training to more in-depth familiarization.  
The maintenance familiarization course is now 5 weeks long and covers vehicle 
characteristics; safety; warnings and cautions; operation of MRAP vehicles; heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems; maintenance procedures; diagnostics 
and troubleshooting procedures; and recovery procedures, with heavy emphasis on 
troubleshooting procedures and maintenance of air conditioning units.  The operator 




opposed to operators.  This course covers the same topics as the original Operator 
Training Course but with a focus on training unit trainers instead of actual operators 
(MRAP University, n.d.).  
In addition to the training provided by MRAP University, the Infantry Center at 
Fort Benning, GA, published a “Smartbook” covering basic vehicle characteristics and 
employment for all MRAP variants (United States Army Infantry Center, 2008).  
Together, MRAP University and the Smartbook provide operators and maintainers the 
minimum information needed to successfully employ the vehicles.  More importantly, 
they demonstrate that training and doctrine development programs can quickly adapt to 
major rapid acquisitions. 
2. Manufacturer-Provided Training 
Some manufacturers have taken the basic training, described above, to a higher 
level by establishing their own facilities and offering training to Service members as well 
as FSRs from other manufacturers.  Participation of FSRs who work for competitors does 
potentially expose proprietary data and technology to view by other manufacturers; 
however, as FPII Executive Vice President Damon Walsh stated, “this is support for the 
troops so we do it for their (other manufacturers’) guys, too.”  FPII provides a training 
program and facilities and offers 40 to 50 hours of FSR training per week.  Additionally, 
FPII requires that trainers have 90 days of job experience and training before they are 
slotted as trainers (2008, August 6). 
Once FSRs have achieved their individual skill levels, they rotate with 
counterparts in theater and the returning FSRs share their knowledge with engineers and 
management stateside.  This contributes to recommended changes in MRAP vehicles 
based on lessons learned from the returning FSRs.  Unlike the other manufacturers, IMG 
does not provide its own FSRs, but instead subcontracts that requirement to DynCorp.  
Although this relieves IMG from the requirement to train and provide FSRs, it also may 
constrain a potential feedback loop when compared to other manufacturers.  When IMG 
wants or needs information about its vehicles, it must request that through DynCorp 
(Major, 2008, August 22).  
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FSR cross-training has proven vital to the operational availability of the MRAP 
vehicle fleet.  As a combat multiplier, FSRs have enabled the DoD to field MRAPs 
without trained maintenance personnel at the organizational level.  This risk acceptance 
was based upon the urgent need and on the fact that MRAP maintenance could leverage 
FSR knowledge and relevant skills of organizational-level mechanics.  In this respect, 
organizational level maintenance personnel already possessed some of the basic 
automotive maintenance skills needed to work on MRAPs.  This represents another 
example of the JPO accepting risk by fielding vehicles before development of a training 
program for operators and maintainers.  This risk acceptance was not without cost, 
however.  As reported by the Associated Press, at least 66 MRAP-related accidents 
occurred between November 2007 and June 2008, with at least 40 of those rollovers 
caused by bad roads, weak bridges, or driver error.  These accidents resulted in five 
soldier deaths (Associated Press, 2008).  Such incidents arguably might have happened in 
any vehicle, but this vividly demonstrates the trade-offs made in fielding MRAPs so 
rapidly. 
G. LOGISTICS SUPPORT  
The initial JPO logistics support strategy was to employ a pure CLS approach 
with manufacturer FSRs and 90-day spares packages supplied at vehicle fielding.  The 
90-day spares packages were determined by the OEMs based on expected short-term 
parts needs.  The initial plan also called for centralized fielding, centralized support, a 
ratio of one FSR for every ten vehicles, and the use of non-standard COTS manuals.  
However, as the program grew from 1,185 to more than 15,000 vehicles, the JPO had to 
adjust the strategy.  Based on the need to get this significantly larger number of MRAP 
vehicles into the hands of warfighters as quickly as possible, the JPO had to conduct 
decentralized simultaneous fieldings as well as perform de-centralized support 
operations.  In addition, the larger number of vehicles in use throughout Iraq made pure 
CLS infeasible.  The JPO therefore changed to a hybrid/organic support concept, with 
manufacturer FSRs assisting organic maintenance personnel.   
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Like the initial pure CLS approach, the hybrid/organic approach relied heavily on 
manufacturer FSRs.  The difference with the hybrid approach was the need for multi-
variant FSRs trained at MRAP University, as previously discussed.  In addition, this 
approach relied on multi-variant new equipment trainers and government depot 
mechanics.  Instead of 90-day spares packages, the JPO supplied units with prescribed 
load listings (PLL) for expected routine repair needs.  Additionally, the JPO supplied 
service support areas (SSAs) with authorized stockage lists (ASL) of parts based on 
analysis of Stryker and other similar vehicles, sized for an estimated 12 months of supply 
with each ASL supporting a density of 25 vehicles.  This approach also relied on 
provisioning parts through the defense supply system and on Government validation of 
manuals for all field-level tasks (Conway, 2008, slide 5).  Changing the strategy in these 
ways allowed the JPO to meet the program objectives of fielding as many survivable 
vehicles as quickly as possible, while still being able to support them.   
To support ongoing operations and prepare for future, purely organic support, the 
JPO planned to execute the provisioning of parts in two phases.  Phase I involved 
assigning Type II NSNs for the items listed in the parts manual, with OEMs as the source 
of supply.  Phase II encompasses the formal provisioning of parts to include assigning 
new Type I NSNs and identifying Type I NSNs already in the system, thereby removing 
OEMs from the supply chain.30  Upon successful completion of parts provisioning, 
scheduled through March 2009, the logistics supply support will shift from parts 
deliveries based on OEM part number data to parts deliveries based on provisioning of 
technical data.  Figure 27 shows the JPO parts provisioning and supply support timeline 




                                                 
30  Type I NSNs are assigned to parts provisioned and verified by EDFP.  Type II NSNs are 
provisional NSNs assigned as an expedient method of entering OEM parts in the defense supply system.  
Once fully provisioned through the use of EDFP, these Type II NSNs are replaced with the permanent 
Type I NSNs, or existing parts with previously assigned Type I NSNs are identified that are identical or are 
suitable substitutes.  This process prevents permanent addition of redundant identical items to the system.  
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Figure 27.   Path Forward: Provisioning and Supply Support  
(From Conway, 2008, Slide 23) 
 
Parts obtained under the hybrid/organic concept are requisitioned through the 
DLA supply system using Type II NSNs.  These requisitions are sent to the OEMs who 
procure the parts from the parts manufacturers.  Parts are then consolidated at RRAD and 
shipped into theater based on priority.  ManTech International Corporation and AECOM 
manage parts consolidation and shipping under contract from the JPO.  These companies 
bring years of logistics distribution experience to the program and their contribution 
allows the JPO to focus on future sustainment planning while providing oversight on the 
current sustainment execution.  To maintain the operational readiness rate at or above 
90%, the JPO also undertakes individual emergency buys through a parts allocation 
board.  This involved risk acceptance by the JPO because unforecasted orders may place 
manufacturers in a position of needing parts for both an emergency buy and for vehicles 
in production.  In fact, this has occurred with FPII; the company has reallocated parts 
assigned for production to meet spares demands in theater (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).   
As the program matures, the JPO plans to transition to a fully organic logistics 
support concept and award long term contracts to sole-source suppliers or add items to 
existing long-term contracts.  Essentially, this means that all parts will be fully 
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provisioned through the DLA supply system and that these parts will come directly from 
the supplier instead of going through the OEM as is now the case.   
1. The Role of the FSR 
As the number of military personnel trained on the MRAP increases, the role 
played by FSRs in day-to-day unit operations varies based on unit and location.  In some 
cases, FSRs perform all maintenance; in others, FSRs provide assistance to unit-level 
mechanics while performing 30-level maintenance.  The level of involvement depends on 
the unit mission and requirements of specific missions.  If the supported unit is 
conducting a mission that is personnel intensive, FSRs have reportedly conducted 
operator-level maintenance, which freed the Service members to participate in that 
mission.  As of this writing, the Army has transitioned to a more organic maintenance 
posture, while the Marine Corps continues to rely heavily on FSRs at the unit level 
(Hansen, 2008, June 10). 
CLS has arguably added significant cost to the MRAP program.  However, when 
considering the urgent need, the JPO did not have time to establish a conventional 
support system.  By employing CLS, the JPO allowed MRAPs to be placed in use while 
concurrently establishing the means to support the product in the present and future.  
Additionally, the JPO awarded contracts to ManTech International Corporation and 
AECOM Technology Corporation to manage the MRAP repair parts consolidation task 
based on their track records of logistical support to the DoD.  CLS was the preferred 
method for this program because it not only reduced the timeline of the fielding process, 
but also enabled the DoD logistics system to make an orderly transition to support the 
new requirement.  As of this writing, all requisitioned parts are consolidated at RRAD by 
ManTech and AECOM and are flown to their destinations based on priority (D. Hansen, 
personal communication, 2008, November 14).  CLS has therefore allowed the JPO to 
focus on fielding a quality product to the warfighter, rather than on sustaining it. 
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2. Commonality 
Although typically a major concern when procuring a new family of vehicles 
(FOV), parts commonality was never a significant consideration given the program 
objectives and acquisition strategy of using multiple manufacturers.  The vehicles 
procured for testing contained proprietary technology that distinguished one 
manufacturer from another.  These prototype vehicles, and the initial production vehicles, 
were designed with limited consideration of GFE and therefore had limited requirement 
for common design interfaces (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  Consequently, design interfaces 
became an issue when the Services requested specific equipment in each of the vehicles. 
The selected MRAP vehicles do not provide 100% commonality across the 
MRAP family of vehicles (FOV), or offer complete commonality within the existing 
DOD vehicle fleet.  They do, however, provide commonality with vehicles widely 
available worldwide in the commercial marketplace.  For example, the FPII Cougar 
model includes a Caterpillar C7 engine and the IMG MaxxPro is built on the widely used 
Navistar severe service chassis.  Caterpillar and International have worldwide distribution 
and support systems, as do most other suppliers of major components to the MRAP 
manufacturers (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  Using five manufacturers suggests added 
complexity for program logistics, but analysis of components from the JPO shows that 
significant commonality exists among the MRAP variants and that many parts are 
currently in use within the existing DoD vehicle fleet.  These components include 
engines, transmissions, transfer cases, axles, oil filters, air filters, fan belts, fuel filters, 
starters, alternators/generators, batteries, and tires.  Figure 28 depicts these commonalities 
among existing vehicles and the MRAP FOV.  This chart indicates that a large number of 
MRAP parts already existed in the supply system.  As such, many military organizations 
already carried these parts on their PLL or ASL (2008, June 10).  Although the lack of 
commonality across the MRAP FOV added complexity to sustainment, the use of widely 





Vehicle Applications BAE (RG-33) GDLS-C (RG-31) IMG (Maxx Pro) FPII (Cougar) BAE-TVS (Caimen)
Engine
Cummins ISL-400e Cummins QSB 6.7(275 HP) INTL DT530 ST Caterpillar C7 Caterpillar C7
Military MRAP Only HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Commerical
Motor Homes, Farm Equipment, Medium 
Duty Trucks, Buses
Farm Equipment, Medium Duty Trucks, 
Construction Equipment Medium Duty Trucks, RV's
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Eng Oil Filter Cummins, Fleetguard, Luberfiner, 
Donaldson, Baldwin 
Cummins, Fleetguard, Luberfiner, 
Donaldson, Baldwin Fleetguard, Luberfiner Baldwin, Donaldson Baldwin, Donaldson, AMSOIL
Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Commerical
Motor Homes, Farm Equipment, Medium 
Duty Trucks, Buses
Farm Equipment, Medium Duty Trucks, 
Construction Equipment Medium Duty Trucks, RV's
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Air Filter
Donaldson, Baldwin, Fram Donaldson, Baldwin, Fram
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Source of Original Parts Vendor Donaldson, Hastings Donaldson, Hastings
Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Commerical
Motor Homes, Farm Equipment, Medium 
Duty Trucks, Buses
Farm Equipment, Medium Duty Trucks, 
Construction Equipment Medium Duty Trucks, RV's
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Fan Belts
Dayco, Ford, Bosch, Hamilton Gates, Bosch, Goodyear, Carlise, Veyance Goodyear, Bosch Gates, Nacco, Goodyear, Bosch MS, Nacco, Goodyear, Veyance, Carlise
Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Commerical
Motor Homes, Farm Equipment, Medium 
Duty Trucks, Buses
Farm Equipment, Medium Duty Trucks, 
Construction Equipment Medium Duty Trucks, RV's
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Starter
Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell
Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Commerical
Motor Homes, Farm Equipment, Medium 
Duty Trucks, Buses
Farm Equipment, Medium Duty Trucks, 
Construction Equipment Medium Duty Trucks, RV's
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Alternator
Niehoff - 400 Amp (N1601-1) Niehoff - 450 Amp Niehoff - 400 Amp (N1602-1) Niehoff - 400 Amp (N1601) Niehoff - 400 Amp (N1602-2 & N1602-3)
Military HMMWV
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Military Application
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Military Application HMMWV
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Military Application
Commerical Marine, Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks Marine, Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks Marine, Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks Marine, Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks Marine, Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks
Fuel Filter(s)
Fleetguard Fleetguard. Mowag International, CAT, Fleetguard Supacat, Baldwin, Cat, Parker Supacat, Baldwin, Cat, Parker, Mowag
Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Commerical
Motor Homes, Farm Equipment, Medium 
Duty Trucks, Buses
Farm Equipment, Medium Duty Trucks, 
Construction Equipment Medium Duty Trucks, RV's
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks
Battery
Interstate, Delco-Remy, Hawker EXIDE, Interstate, Hawker EXIDE, Interstate, Hawker EXIDE, Interstate, Hawker EXIDE, Interstate, Hawker
Military Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet
Commerical Commerical Wide Commerical Wide Commerical Wide Commerical Wide Commerical Wide
Tire
Michelin, Goodyear Michelin, Goodyear Michelin, Goodyear Michelin, Goodyear Michelin, Goodyear
Military 39585R20 XZL 365/80R20 39585R20 XZL 39585R20XZL 395/85R20 XML
Commerical Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet
Transmission
Allison Allison S-2500SP Allison 3000SP Allison 3500SP Allison
Military MRAP MRAP MRAP MRAP Caimen, FMTV
Commerical
Motor Homes, Farm Equipment, Medium 
Duty Trucks, Buses
Farm Equipment, Medium Duty Trucks, 
Construction Equipment Medium Duty Trucks, RV's
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks




Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Source of Original Parts Vendor
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Source of Original Parts Vendor Cushman 315N
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Source of Original Parts Vendor
Military
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Military Application
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Military Application
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Military Application
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Military Application
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine 
Military Application
Commerical Farm Equipment, Medium Duty Trucks, R0079495 Medium Duty Trucks, RV's
Medium Duty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire 
Trucks




Figure 28.   Parts Commonality Matrix  
(From MRAP JPO, 2008, June 2) 
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As Figure 28 demonstrates, the MRAP FOV includes four engine models by three 
manufacturers:  Cummins, Inc., International Truck and Engine Corporation, and 
Caterpillar.  The Cummins QSB engine used on the RG-31, for example, is also used in 
the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) and the Caterpillar C7 engine is 
used on the Stryker, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), and the Marine 
Corps’ Light Armored Vehicle (LAV).  Since these engines are already in the supply 
system, repair parts are readily available.  Additionally, these companies are globally 
established, providing the DoD an alternate method of procurement should a problem 
arise with the normal supply distribution program.    
H. FACILITIES 
All facilities used by the MRAP JPO are referred to as issue points or RSAs.  To 
establish such sites, the JPO needed huge areas for use as parking lots, buildings for 
vehicle processing, areas for installation of last-minute items (such as IED jammers), and 
finally, areas for mechanics to work on the vehicles.  Each site included an implied task 
of providing shop tools such as hydraulic lifts and air compressors necessary for 
conducting vehicle maintenance.  Essentially, every site needed to replicate a 
maintenance bay with all infrastructure support.  This section of the report provides an 
overview of the facilities in Charleston, SC; Kuwait; Iraq; and Afghanistan, and their 
effect on the value stream in MRAP fielding.    
1. Charleston 
As previously discussed, SPAWAR in Charleston, SC, was selected as the 
integration facility based on its capabilities and prior experience in up-armored 
HMMWV integration.  In addition to its proximity to the aerial port of debarkation 
(APOD) and the sea port of debarkation (SPOD), the facility also provided expertise in 
engineering and testing of C4I systems.  SPAWAR’s Poseidon Park facility not only 
allowed the execution of three major types of C4I tests, but also allowed these tests to be 
completed in 30 days.  As stated by SPAWAR’s industrial engineer, Pete Ward, “If we 
did not have Poseidon Park, we could not have done that in 30 days” (2008, August 5). 
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 To provide insurance against work stoppage due to hurricane or other natural 
disaster, SPAWAR positioned an identical site set-up about 10 miles from the primary 
site.  This alternate site ensured continuous integration of vehicles and only required the 
movement of personnel and equipment for it to be operational.  
2. Kuwait 
The facilities in use in Kuwait are fully mature due to continuous U.S. presence in 
that nation since the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  The JPO had no issues securing sites to 
conduct vehicle disembarkation procedures and the infrastructure within the country also 
supported the rapid movement the program required.  Many facilities were available for 
rent and immediate occupation such as at Ali-Al-Salim Airbase, which has functioned as 
the APOD in Kuwait since the military terminal at Kuwait International Airport ceased 
operations in 2004.  The required port facilities were no different as huge port areas were 
not being utilized; these facilities were constructed by the U.S. during Operations Desert 
Shield and Storm.  The JPO chose the facility best suited to its needs among the many 
available at the Kuwaiti port and converted it into a functional support activity by making 
minimal changes such as installing air conditioners, lighting, and hydraulic lifts.  Thus, 
establishing the RSA in Kuwait was not a significant issue for the JPO and the same 
applied for facilities in Iraq (D. Hansen, personal communication, 2008, October 15).  
Although not an issue, the well-positioned facilities aided the timely movement of the 
vehicles to warfighters. 
3. Iraq 
The JPO considers Iraq as a mature theater that is lacking some minor 
infrastructure support.  The use of plywood shelters and tents at forward operating bases 
supports this classification.  Therefore, to establish issue points (IPs) and RSAs in Iraq, 
the JPO took extra measures that included pouring concrete slabs for maintenance bays 
and erecting sprung shelters.  Nine different sites were established in Iraq, each with 
requirements unique to its location.  These sites included Mosul, Tikrit, Al-Taqaddum, 
Kalsu, Talul, Baghdad, Taji, Balad, and Kirkuk.  Of the nine sites, four were established 
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as RSAs and therefore had the capacity to perform battle damage repairs.  These RSAs 
are depicted in Figure 29.  Their strategically dispersed locations provide support to 
Service members, and the locations are easily accessible through established main supply 
routes (D. Hansen, personal communication, 2008, October 15). 
Besides the basic infrastructure required at the IPs and RSAs, the JPO also built 
living facilities at some locations to house FSRs supporting the program.  These living 
facilities included containerized housing units, latrines, and showers, all of which were 
the responsibility of the JPO.  The presence of the fielding and support teams at these 
locations, coupled with the new equipment and facilities, contributed to the rapid fielding 
of MRAP vehicles. 
 
 
Figure 29.   RSA Locations within Iraq  
(From Conway, 2008, slide 27) 
 
4. Afghanistan  
Unlike the facilities in Kuwait and Iraq, those in Afghanistan were very immature 
and lacked the infrastructure needed to support the MRAP program.  Due to constraints 
on suitable locations and space within forward operating bases, limited options existed 










into Kandahar and Baghram, with additional issue points at Jalalabad and FOB Salerno.  
The base JPO plan for Afghanistan involved establishing four RSAs with a budget of just 
under $500 million.  Included in this cost estimation is fencing for expansion of forward 
operating bases and the cost of procuring additional land needed for work areas (D. 
Hansen, personal communication, 2008, October 15).  Figure 30 below shows the 
fielding locations within Afghanistan.  
 
 
Figure 30.   Current Fielding Locations within Afghanistan  
(From MRAP JPO, 2008, October 18) 
 
The multiple IPs and RSAs located within the respective theaters are another 
example of how the JPO fielded MRAP vehicles and how it is supporting those vehicles 
in a rapid manner.  Centrally locating RSAs led to low turnaround times for battle-
damaged MRAP vehicles, thereby improving operational availability.  As of this writing, 
the RSAs have returned all but 50 MRAP vehicles to fully mission capable status (MRAP 
JPO, 2008, October 28).  The vehicles have been repaired and returned to duty largely 
due to FSRs on site, OEM parts on hand, and the available equipment at these facilities to 
rebuild the vehicles.  
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I. TRANSPORTATION 
The initial transportation plan called for completed MRAPs to be shipped and 
flown directly from Charleston, SC, to Iraq or Kuwait.  These vehicles would then be de-
processed at the destination before being issued to the receiving units.  Until October 
2007, all MRAPs were flown into the Iraqi theater because of the urgent need, with the 
flow reaching three hundred and eighty vehicles per month.  Vehicles were flown into Ali 
Al-Salim Airbase in Kuwait as well as Balad Airbase located on Camp Anaconda in Iraq 
(Hansen, 2008, June 10).  The JPO, Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), individual 
Services, combatant commands, and DCMA shared the responsibility of placing the 
vehicles into warfighter hands.   
As of this writing, the average time required to ship and field MRAP vehicles is 
thirty days from the time the vehicle leaves the US.  The process of moving the vehicles 
into theater is depicted in Figure 31 and shows the 10-step process.  First, the completed 
MRAPs are inspected and accepted by DCMA representatives at the manufacturer 
locations.  The MRAP contracts specify Freight On Board Origin (FOB) and the co-
location of DCMA assets with manufacturers assists in conditional acceptance of vehicles 
prior to transport.  Next, vehicles are transported from the various manufacturing sites by 
trailer to SPAWAR in Charleston, SC, where the third step, GFE integration, takes place.  
Responsibility during this step lies with the MRAP JPO.  Following GFE integration, the 
vehicles are tested and driven to Charleston Air Force Base for airlift or to Charleston 
Naval Weapon Station for sealift.  Vehicles identified for use within the U.S. are 
transported to their destinations by trailer.  Once the vehicles are delivered to the APOD 
and SPOD, TRANSCOM assumes responsibility for the air- and sealift.  
The vehicles arriving in Kuwait undergo de-processing and await intra-theater 
transport which is the responsibility of the combatant commands.  These vehicles are sent 
to respective IPs in Iraq by trailer where the JPO re-assumes responsibility.  Receiving 
units then draw the vehicles, conduct familiarization training as per Service-specific 
standards, and then move to their respective forward operating bases.  
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Figure 31.   Transportation Pipeline and Responsibility  
(After MRAP JPO, 2008, October 21) 
 
When the MRAP production rate surpassed the TRANSCOM airlift limit of 380 
vehicles per-month, the JPO moved to surface-shipping as the primary means of 
transportation to Iraq.  With the ability to transport up to 500 vehicles per-ship, and 
production rates exceeding 1000 per-month by early 2008, vehicle flow eventually 
exceeded both the 250 vehicle per-week de-processing capability in Kuwait, as well as 
the ability of units to receive vehicles given ongoing combat operations.  As the queue 
filled at multiple sites in Kuwait and Iraq, the program shifted entirely to ship-borne 
transportation by May 2008.  MRAPs bound for Afghanistan, however, must still be 
airlifted because of that country’s landlocked and remote location (Hansen, 2008, June 
10). 
1. Transportation Cost Oversight 
Transportation was one of the most significant cost elements for the MRAP 
program; therefore, the mode of transportation was a significant concern for the JPO.  At  
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the height of fielding operations, airlift costs were $134,000 per vehicle versus $18,200 
per vehicle for sealift.  Hence, the transition to sealift for the Iraq theater resulted in a 
huge cost savings relative to airlift.   
2. MEAP 
Among many issues that arose from airlifting MRAP vehicles was the extra 
protection of the EFP kits that resulted from the MEAP program.  Depending on the 
variant, these kits add anywhere from 4,300 to 11,000 pounds per vehicle, which in some 
cases puts the vehicles over their GVWR.  Besides the weight, most of the aircraft used to 
transport these vehicles could not accommodate the width of the vehicle once the kit was 
installed.  Airlifting vehicles with EFP kits installed was therefore not a feasible option, 
and the EFP kits were flown separately and mounted at destination. Not all MRAPs were 
retrofitted with EFP kits, and, as of this writing, only the vehicles destined for areas prone 
to EFPs receive the kits (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  
The addition of EFP kits has also caused problems in ground transportation.  The 
additional weight changes a vehicle’s center of gravity, complicating trailer transport.  
This creates problems even in the U.S. where road conditions are better than in Iraq.  
However, once these kits are bolted on in Kuwait, movement by trailer is the only 
available means of moving them into Iraq for fielding.  Installing these kits in Kuwait 
alleviated the transportation problem from the U.S. into theater but added a problem of 
transportation from Kuwait into Iraq (2008, June 10). 
Logistically, EFP kit additions in theater caused major concern for the JPO as it 
created requirements for, among other things, personnel to do the work, lease space for 
the actual work, and the health and welfare of the personnel.  Despite these challenges, 
the JPO has successfully shipped the EFP kits and vehicles separately, married them in 
theater, and delivered them to warfighters (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  This additional 
requirement and complexity in the value stream, meanwhile, has been transparent to 
receiving units.   
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J. FIELDING OPERATIONS 
As with sustainment, the MRAP program is unique in its initial lack of a fielding 
plan.  No real plan existed because the JPO did not initially know the total requirements 
at the time fielding started.  The program objectives, on the other hand, were very 
simple–field as many survivable vehicles as fast as possible; everything else remained 
secondary. In the early stages of the program, this meant a fielding timeline of production 
plus 60 days (Hansen, 2008, June 10).  The MRAP fielding process was no different than 
the regular process any unit would undergo in drawing vehicles.  The difference existed 
in the expedited fielding, characterized by the “truncated,” or shortened, training that 
operators and maintainers underwent prior to receiving the vehicles.   
The fielding process varies between the Services and individual units based on 
Service-specific standing operating procedures (SOPs) and prior unit experience with 
MRAPs.  Units with more familiarity conduct an expedited fielding process, while others 
spend up to five days in familiarization training before completing their equipment draw.  
As an example, Army units typically conduct 5 days of operator and maintenance training 
and account for all ASL and PLL parts in the presence of a mechanic before receiving the 
vehicle.  Marine Corps units, on the other hand, typically conduct a much less rigid 
fielding process, preferring to place the vehicles directly into operation (Hansen, 2008, 
June 10).       
This expedited fielding process represents yet another trade-off made by the JPO 
in support of the program strategy.  Whereas a typical new equipment fielding would 
include an extensive training and familiarization period for operators and maintainers, the 
urgent need required MRAPs to be placed into immediate operation. 
K. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS 
This overview of MRAP logistics planning and execution highlights numerous 
factors that contributed to program success.  As previous analysis has shown, many of the 
trade-offs that enabled rapid MRAP fielding involve risk acceptance in sustainment.  
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Accordingly, the key factors from a logistics standpoint are those which mitigate this risk 
of fielding an unsupportable and unsustainable vehicle. 
First, the JPO mitigated complexity in sustaining MRAP vehicles by using CLS to 
execute sustainment operations.  A combination of manufacturer FSRs, OEM new 
equipment training (NET) trainers, and organic Service mechanics ensured that vehicle 
fielding occurred on a compressed timeline.  Co-locating FSRs with units in theater 
ensured that vehicles remained mission ready, evident in the operational readiness rate of 
the MRAP FOV.  FSRs provided units with the expertise needed to maintain MRAPs and 
enabled unit mechanics to concentrate on other missions such as maintaining other 
equipment or augmenting combat patrols.  The trade-off, however, of having co-located 
FSRs was that the JPO was responsible for the health and well-being of those individuals.   
In addition to maintenance support, CLS also enabled the sustainment of MRAP 
vehicles while parts were being provisioned in the defense supply system.  OEM supply 
systems with initial spares packages ensured that parts were readily available and 
accessible to the warfighter during fielding.  As the program transitioned to organic 
support, established supply chain management companies such as ManTech International 
and AECOM also ensured the continuous flow of parts to keep the vehicles operational. 
A second major factor contributing to the MRAP program success involved 
providing a common place for learning, also known as MRAP University.  This ensured 
FSRs and select Service members were cross-trained on products from all manufacturers 
and that key maintainers and operators had the expertise needed to safely operate and 
maintain the vehicles.  This cross-training allowed the JPO to conduct decentralized, 
simultaneous fielding and fulfill decentralized support requirements.   
In conclusion, the key logistics factors again follow the trends prevalent 
throughout the MRAP program.  Use of a CLS approach allowed concurrency in 
normally sequential tasks by ensuring sustainment of MRAP vehicles while the DoD 
built an organic sustainment capability.  MRAP University contributed to this 
concurrency in operations by providing a base of knowledge to key personnel while 
operators and maintainers adapted to the new vehicles.  As before, however, the 
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conditions that allowed concurrency also required risk acceptance.  This came in the form 
of compressed new equipment training and the risk of fielding vehicles without full 
knowledge of their limitations or maintenance requirements.  As before, however, these 
trade-offs were necessary factors for the program to successfully meet overall objectives. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
As of October 21, 2008, more than 9,000 MRAP vehicles have been fielded to 
warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, with nearly 4,000 more progressing through the 
integration and transportation process (MRAP JPO, 2008, October 21).  Considering 
MARCORSYSCOM released the original RFP in November 2006, this is an 
unprecedented DoD acquisition accomplishment that required flexibility and priority of 
effort within the DoD, industry, and Congress.  Although detailed data indicating MRAP 
effectiveness in saving lives is held at the classified level, substantial anecdotal evidence, 
as well as significantly reduced casualties in Iraq through 2008, indicates that MRAP 
vehicles are indeed survivable.  By these criteria, the MRAP program has been effective 
in meeting the program objectives of fielding as many survivable vehicles as quickly as 
possible.   
The question of whether the program has met warfighter needs is more difficult to 
address, given the requirement was largely top- rather than user-driven.  Again, however, 
substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that MRAP vehicles have largely met warfighter 
needs by providing survivability and the required mobility for most missions in Iraq.  For 
Afghanistan and the much more restrictive terrain associated with that country, however, 
the question is more difficult to answer.  Effectiveness in meeting warfighter needs is 
therefore best assessed in how the program addressed the range of needs.  In this case, the 
final LRIP purchases of smaller vehicles and the latest evolution of the program, the 
MATLCV, demonstrates that the MRAP program is not forcing an ineffective solution, 
but is tailoring the solution for maximum effectiveness in the operational environment.  
From this perspective, the MRAP program has met warfighter needs. 
The success of the MRAP program is attributable to many factors, all of which 
point back to the overall program objectives of fielding as many survivable vehicles as 
quickly as possible.  This chapter summarizes the key factors, starting with a comparison 
to prior research and an overview of additional factors that contributed specifically to the 
MRAP program and concluding with the significant trade-offs involved.   
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Research indicates that four conditions must exist for a successful rapid 
acquisition program:  existence of a materiel solution, user acceptance, leadership 
acceptance, and a dedicated source of funding.  Analysis of the MRAP program generally 
conforms to these conditions, but with exceptions.  Comparison with this prior research is 
as follows: 
• Prior research involving rapid acquisitions concludes that a materiel solution 
must exist that meets the user’s requirements.  Further, this solution must be 
technologically mature and ready for production.  In the case of MRAP, this 
largely holds true.  At the program outset, FPII produced multiple variants of 
MRAP vehicles that were already in operational use.  FPII vehicles, as well as 
those built by BAE and GDLS were based on technology and designs that 
date back 30 years.  In that respect, a materiel solution did exist, although 
large production capacity did not.  IMG vehicle design and status as the 
largest MRAP producer provides an exception to this condition, however, in 
that it did not have a materiel solution at the program start.  Rather, that 
company had only a concept based on proven technology.  This shows that a 
complete materiel solution is not a key factor in enabling a rapid acquisition; 
the key factor is the presence of a mature technology that meets the 
requirement.  Had extensive research and development work been required, 
the MRAP program would not have progressed as it did.  The IMG example, 
however, demonstrates that a world-class manufacturer can rapidly take a 
mature technology from concept to fielded product.  This indicates that 
emphasis should be placed as much on the required technology as on an off-
the-shelf product when researching materiel solutions for urgent needs.  In 
cases where the technology exists, the program strategy should include ways 
of incentivizing industry to apply that technology in a rapidly produced 
product.  
• User acceptance of any fielded product must be considered before assessing 
its overall success in meeting a requirement.  For the MRAP program, user 
acceptance depends largely on the time frame of the assessment.  Prior to 
 121
Secretary Gates making the MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority, no 
consensus existed within the user community, and particularly within the 
Army, over the best way of addressing the IED threat.  Since the program 
start, however, MRAPs have gained widespread user acceptance, although 
with recognition of the limits based on size and maneuverability.  This 
acceptance, therefore, conforms to prior research from the perspective of how 
warfighters have used the MRAP.  It does not, however, indicate that user 
acceptance is critical at program start. 
• Perhaps more than any other factor, the MRAP program demonstrates the 
importance of leadership acceptance in the success of a rapid acquisition 
program.  Even after the initial JUONS validation in December 2006, 
consensus did not exist in the user community or the senior DoD leadership 
that MRAP offered the best solution to the IED threat.  Through the spring of 
2007, MRAP was still largely a Marine Corps initiative.  When Secretary 
Gates prioritized the program first among all DoD programs, however, he 
effectively established leadership acceptance and a broad mandate for the 
program.  From that point on, the program commanded the priority of effort at 
every level within the DoD.  This indicates that leadership acceptance enabled 
program success more than any other factor, and largely influenced the user 
acceptance that followed. 
• The final condition, a dedicated funding source, is critical for any acquisition 
program regardless of whether it is rapid or standard in nature.  The urgent 
need and scale of the program with requirements exceeding $22 billion 
precluded funding through the standard PPBES process.  Its priority and 
backing within the DoD and Congress enabled it to receive sufficient funding 
through reprogrammed funds, and emergency and supplemental 
appropriations.  The MRAP program conforms to prior research in that it 
required money through non-standard sources.  The tremendous political 
support ensured the program had relatively little resistance in obtaining those 
funds.  
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In addition to the conditions identified in prior research, two key factors enabled 
the MRAP program to field more than 9,000 vehicles by late October 2008:  concurrency 
and risk acceptance.  Both are related in that concurrency is a direct example of risk 
acceptance; yet they are distinct in the ways they enabled rapid execution of the program.  
Just as important is the tremendous political and DoD leadership support the program 
received from inception.  The political support enabled the program to receive more than 
$22 billion in funding through non-standard sources, as well as the flexibility to obligate 
those funds as needed and with speed consistent with the program execution.  DoD 
leadership support gave the program top priority within the DoD and industry, effectively 
focusing all resources on the effort.  This support, specifically from Congress and the 
Secretary of Defense, set the conditions for the PM to apply the two key factors of 
concurrency and risk acceptance to the program. 
Concurrency in execution is the first key factor that enabled rapid execution of the 
MRAP program.  This applied throughout the program and is evident in the following 
examples: 
• The program executed all phases of the acquisition management framework 
simultaneously, rather than in sequence.  As of this writing, the JPO is 
involved in activities associated with concept refinement, technology 
development, systems development and demonstration, production and 
deployment, and operations and support, to include disposal.   
• Manufacturers initiated vehicle production prior to and during developmental 
testing.  In a normal acquisition, developmental testing would be complete 
before production of vehicles for fielding. 
• DCMA conditionally accepted vehicles to allow concurrent integration, 
deficiency correction, and continuous flow to warfighters.  DCMA normally 
requires correction of all deficiencies prior to acceptance. 
• The program simultaneously fielded vehicles while building the organic 
capability to support them.  Normally, a program builds sustainment 
capability prior to fielding. 
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Additional examples of concurrency exist throughout the program execution, 
representing the single biggest factor in how the program compressed what would 
normally be a much longer schedule. 
Risk acceptance is the second key factor that enabled rapid acquisition of MRAP 
vehicles, and is largely connected to the concurrency in execution.  Risk acceptance came 
in multiple forms and in all phases of the acquisition.  Examples of risk acceptance 
critical to the rapid execution of the MRAP program include the following:  
• Acceptance of a materiel solution not necessarily based on consensus in the 
user community and not ideally suited to the operational environment 
increased the risk of committing to a product that did not meet warfighter 
needs. 
• Award of LRIP contracts prior to testing involved risk of procuring vehicles 
that could not ultimately be used.   
• Award of LRIP contracts based heavily on survivability testing meant risk of 
procuring vehicles that were unreliable or difficult to maintain.   
• Advanced purchase of materials and production capacity expansion by 
manufacturers before award of production contracts increased risk of 
manufacturer losses and liability to the Government. 
• Conditional acceptance of vehicles with minor deficiencies increased tracking 
requirements and involved risk of passing deficiencies to warfighters. 
• Procurement of multiple variants from multiple manufacturers increased risk 
of high life cycle cost and complexity in sustainment. 
• Fielding vehicles before parts were fully provisioned in the defense logistics 
system involved risk of fielding an unsustainable vehicle.   
The program includes numerous other examples of risk acceptance, all of which 
contributed to the overall objective of fielding as many survivable vehicles as quickly as 
possible. 
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As with any decision, the risk acceptance and concurrency that enabled rapid 
execution of the MRAP program came with trade-offs.  As one example, the use of a 
COTS technology and materiel solution resulted in procurement of thousands of vehicles 
that are largely one-dimensional.  The size and weight of the MRAP vehicles limit 
mobility in restrictive terrain, thereby limiting the range of mission capability.  Although 
very effective at increasing survivability, MRAP vehicles do so at the expense of 
mobility and, therefore, do not meet all warfighter needs.  As another example, the use of 
multiple manufacturers, although critical in achieving the desired production rates, 
increased training requirements for operators and maintainers, added complexity in 
sustainment, and increased life-cycle costs as compared to a common vehicle.  Multiple 
other trade-offs exist for every case of risk acceptance in the program.  
In conclusion, the MRAP program represents an important example of how the 
defense acquisition system can rapidly react to meet warfighter needs.  This report 
highlights the key factors that enabled program success in rapidly fielding thousands of 
vehicles:  concurrency and risk acceptance enabled by unprecedented political and DoD 
leadership support.  Political and DoD leadership support, obviously, is situation 
dependent and is largely out of a PM’s control.  In addition, concurrent execution of 
acquisition processes and heavy risk acceptance is not appropriate for every program.  
Therefore, this report does not provide a guide to rapid acquisitions that can apply to all 
programs.  It does, however, provide an example of risk acceptance and concurrent 
execution that can be tailored to the urgency of many needs on a case-by-case basis.  In 
addition, the modified acquisition process used to develop and field the MRAP 
demonstrates that the current acquisition management framework and JCIDS process are 
flexible enough to enable rapid execution of major weapons systems. 
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